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This dissertation project focused on affective and unconscious processes involved 
in the evaluation of public policy. It follows recent scholarship in political psychology 
showing how the response to political messages depends greatly on what values and 
emotions are evoked. Of particular focus has been the notable discrepancy between the 
conscious way people construe their political judgments and the unconscious operations 
that more truly account for their views and actions. Motivated by a neuroscientific and 
psychoanalytic model of the mind and brain that recognizes both the pre-eminence of 
unconscious (implicit) processing and the primacy of affect in mind (brain) activity, this 
study investigated the impact of emotionally-valenced introductory sentences on 
judgments of public policy. A cross-sectional New York City sample of 367 English-
speaking adults completed anonymous questionnaires, in which they evaluated written 
statements by hypothetical candidates for public office. Political messages pertained to 
issues of energy and immigration reform, and varied only in the emotional quality of their 
introductory sentences; identical policy statements were either preceded by a values-
based, affective introduction or by a parallel, non-affective introduction composed of 
bland verbiage. The hypothesis that the emotionally evocative introductory sentences 
would operate in a generalized way in persons across the political spectrum, by 
amplifying message ratings, was not borne out by the data. Rather, results indicated 
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relevant differences in the impact of the affective introductions, associated with issue, 
policy condition and, most notably, political party. Differential, and often opposite, 
effects of the introductory language were seen, depending on participants’ political 
persuasion. Magnitudes of effect, when detected, were moderate to large, suggesting a 
practical significance to these differences. Noteworthy patterns also emerged with regard 
to order of message presentation, highlighting the import of contrast in the evaluative 
process. Implications of these findings will be discussed in relation to the premise that 
affective factors are the principal driver of human behavior and decision-making. Future 
research should include a more sensitive assessment of initial attitude towards each 
policy, and should utilize methodology that can more conclusively answer questions 
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This dissertation project focuses on the role of affective and unconscious 
processes in the formation of political judgments. Through an empirical examination of 
affective priming in political messaging, the study investigates whether framing public 
policy statements in emotionally evocative ways will influence evaluations of those 
policies. The guiding premise for this research is that affective, rather than cognitive, 
material is the principal driver of human behavior and decision-making, and that most, if 
not all, of the evaluative process occurs outside of conscious awareness.  
This work lies at the intersection of clinical, social and political psychology, but 
largely belongs to the growing discourse on psychological dynamics in political 
communication. It concerns the way people react to candidates, platforms, speeches, 
policies, and, most notably, the huge discrepancy between the conscious way people 
construe their judgments and the unconscious operations that more completely account 
for their views and actions. More distally, the project relates to communication in 
psychotherapy and mechanisms of therapeutic action: What enables change in 
psychotherapy? What is the role of affect in this process? And how, as therapists, can we 
utilize language to facilitate this change?  
Theoretical and empirical support for this research comes primarily from an 
integration of psychoanalytic psychology and neuroscience; ancillary support is provided 
by literature from the disciplines of social psychology, political science, cognitive 
linguistics, marketing, and media and cultural studies.  
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The psychoanalytic tradition has long anchored itself in the centrality of 
unconscious processes in human behavior. Bolstered by neuroscientific advances, an 
explosion of empirical research from nearly every corner of the cognitive sciences (e.g. 
memory, perception, learning, and decision-making), has amounted to a solid and 
converging literature documenting that people are not very aware of what motivates their 
actions. (Hassin, Uleman & Bargh, 2005; Gilhooley, 2008)  
Scholarship from psychology and the affective brain sciences provides robust 
empirical and theoretical support for the supremacy of affect in brain and behavioral 
processes. Research from social and political psychology has demonstrated that judgment 
and decision-making is more often governed by affective than cognitive constraints, and 
further, that this is largely an implicit process (one which occurs and operates outside of 
conscious awareness) (Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson, 1999; Westen & Arkowitz, 2002; 
Westen & Gabbard, 2002). Neuroscientists, in elucidating the neural bases of emotion, 
have come to the same conclusions: that we are organized around, and principally shaped 
by, affective mechanisms (Damasio, 1994; Siegel, 1999; Panksepp, 2008; Berlin, 2011).  
On a related note, psychoanalytic theory and applied research offers a rich 
literature on the prominent role of emotional experience in therapeutic action (Gabbard & 
Westen, 2006; Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 2006; Greenberg 2012). In fact, data from a 
wide range of psychotherapies are converging to show that affectively involved treatment 
is more effective in bringing about change than treatment that engages people in an 
intellectualized fashion (Whelton, 2004). 
In recent years, attention has turned to similar ideas regarding politics, exploring 
the interplay of psychological processes on political judgments. Findings indicate that 
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affective dynamics also explain the way people vote for candidates and on issues. What is 
more, political influence has been found to occur mostly through unconscious affective 
channels, in spite of its apparent appeal to conscious, ‘rational’ thought processes 
(Marcus, Neuman & Mackuen, 2000; Westen, 2007). 
Significance and Rationale for the Study 
Within a therapeutic context, psychologists aim to use language to communicate 
with people emotionally in a way that motivates positive change. Although techniques 
vary, the therapeutic process often involves creating meaningful narratives, presumably 
forming new associative networks so as to enable and maintain behavioral change. 
Targeting emotionality, vis-à-vis language choice, is a prime way in which practitioners 
resonate with those they treat.  
Outside of a therapeutic context, these mechanisms of influence are shared by 
other disciplines, such as marketing and advertising, concerned with inducing changes in 
people’s attitudes and behaviors. Though many eschew the notion that there is an aspect 
of ‘persuasion’ to the therapeutic process, there is good reason to believe that there is; 
acknowledging and doing our best to understand this means of influence is vital to being 
skilled and ethical practitioners. 
Politics offers a unique perspective from which to examine this process of 
influence, and to witness the ways in which affectively evocative verbiage can contribute 
to shaping and framing positions. Political messages that do not differ in their general 
underlying policy positions can vary greatly in their impact, depending on what values, 
images and feelings they evoke. Although common to advertising, marketing and 
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psychology, this principle holds a unique import in politics, where the implicit processes 
that guide decision-making may have tremendous consequences for the public at large.  
Language plays an integral role in who holds sway in political conversation, and 
is consequently a contested space in terms of political influence. One dramatic 
demonstration of the relationship between language and political influence is the history 
of abortion politics in the United States over the past four decades. The leaders of the 
anti-abortion movement in the 1970’s, by luck or wisdom, coined the phrase “pro-life” to 
represent their position, thereby setting the terms of the debate. Would not everyone be 
drawn to this value-driven, emotionally resonant identification if we did not know the 
acquired cultural meaning of the term “pro-life”? Would you be anti-life?; Or, perhaps, 
pro-death? The words frame the value associations, and suggest that if you are in favor of 
abortion rights, you do not value life. In comparison, the use of the term “pro-choice” 
falls short in terms of impact; we all like choices, but ‘choice’ doesn’t ring as many 
emotional bells, or set the networks of associations firing to the same degree as ‘life’ 
does.  
Politicians, psychotherapists, religious leaders, and advertisers communicate with 
their respective audiences in ways that are compelling, inspire confidence and make the 
listener feel in some way understood. Drawing similarities between the aforementioned 
professions can be unsettling; we prefer to think separately of our political leaders, our 
priests, and advertising hucksters. And well we should, as their goals, decisions and 
morals (we hope) are quite different. But while their intentions may differ, the means of 
influence—the ways they induce us to change our attitudes, shift our beliefs, make 
choices or otherwise ‘move’ us—are strikingly similar.  Whether the aim is to heal, sell, 
   5!
persuade, or win an election, ‘getting the message right’ goes beyond simply presenting 
people with the right information. 
Statement of Purpose 
The aim of this research was to explore the role of emotional and unconscious 
processes in the formation of political judgments by examining the impact of affective 
priming on people’s appraisals of political messages. To what extent can simply framing 
political messages with emotionally evocative, values-based introductory statements 
influence preference? Are political judgments consistent with a convergent finding 
demonstrated in scholarship spanning from psychoanalytic traditions to bourgeoning 
research in affective neuroscience regarding the preeminence of affective, unconscious 
processes? Specifically, the following research questions and hypotheses are addressed in 
this study:  
Research questions.  
1. Will priming participants with emotionally compelling introductory 
sentences influence how they judge identical public policy statements?  
2. If so, how will this influence compare with that of the policy information 
presented?  
3. And, will this be independent of political party and orientation? 
Hypotheses. 
1. When primed with emotionally evocative, values-laden introductions to 
policy statements, participants will judge political messages more 
favorably than when the same policy statement is presented with a less 
affective introduction. 
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2. Variations in emotionally compelling language will impact participants’ 
evaluations of the messages beyond the effect of the substantive attributes 
of the policy positions.  








Before returning to a description of the study and its results, I review literature 
germane to the intersection of politics, emotion and unconscious processing. This review 
will contextualize the variables explored in this research. I begin with a selected review 
of the literature in the area of unconscious processing in order to provide both theoretical 
and empirical grounding for the construct and, by extension, its inclusion in this study.   
Unconscious Processes 
Within the sub-fields of psychology there are different ways of understanding and 
explaining mental activity that occurs outside of conscious awareness, and 
correspondingly, a host of different terms used to describe these processes (e.g. 
unconscious, nonconscious, implicit, automatic, anoetic, unknowing). Despite the 
nuanced distinctions which differentiate these terms, there is much more agreement than 
disagreement about the “unexperienced aspects” of mental life (Vandekerckhove & 
Panksepp, 2009). Therefore, for the purposes of the present discussion, the concept of 
unconscious processing is considered in an inclusive and broad sense. Terminology 
notwithstanding, across disciplines, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that information 
can be acted upon without it being explicitly in our awareness (Tulving, 2001). 
Despite strong and ever-mounting empirical support, unconscious processing 
remains undervalued within academic psychology. There are myriad potential reasons for 
resistance to the idea of unconscious. One, mentioned by a number of scholars, is the 
palpable discomfort with, or even fear of, the notion that our behavior and general 
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functioning is influenced by unconscious perceptions and thought processes (Dixon, 
1986; Nørretranders, 1998; Dijksterhuis, Aarts & Smith, 2005). In other words, the idea 
that there are thoughts, emotions, and motives that operate outside of our explicit 
awareness is simply unwelcome to people. Another explanation for the still controversial 
and even taboo status of the unconscious is a prevailing negative bias towards 
psychoanalysis among many modern psychological scientists. That it remains shrouded 
in skepticism for many, consequent to intrapsychic, historical or other such reasons, 
stands in contradiction to the now incontrovertible empirical evidence for the 
phenomenon (and preeminence) of unconscious processing.  
Psychoanalytic theory. The notion that there is an unconscious aspect to mental 
life has been most readily (almost ubiquitously) associated with Freud and his pioneering 
conceptualization. The foundation of the psychoanalytic position is that unconscious 
material (i.e., the unrecognized nature of what we want, fear, need) can lead us to act 
against our conscious interests - often in ways that create distress and maladaptive 
functioning. Freud’s then-provocative perspective provided the platform upon which 
theories of personality, psychopathology, and psychoanalytic technique would later be 
built. Although Freud’s conceptualization of the nature of the unconscious evolved 
throughout his career, he never swayed from the fundamental notion that material located 
within the unconscious (although potentially able to be brought into consciousness) 
exerts great influence over human behavior while in its unconscious state. 
Freud’s notion of a dynamic unconscious saw opposition from the rise of 
behaviorism in the 1950’s. Reflective of the zeitgeist, and exemplified in the field of 
perception research, the idea of an unconscious aspect to perception was profoundly 
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rejected. There was an unwillingness to accept what Erdelyi (1974) described as, “the 
verbally simple but theoretically profound idea that motives and expectations impinge 
upon perceptions” (p.2). The following statement is an example of the reaction to this 
theory – that perception may be influenced by unconscious defensive processes – among 
most perception researchers at the time: “To speak of perceptual defense is to use a mode 
of discourse which must make any precise or even intelligible meaning of perceptual 
defense impossible, for it is to speak of perceptual process as somehow being both a 
process of knowing and a process of avoiding knowing.” (Howie, 1952, p.311, as quoted 
by Erderlyi, 1974). The concurrent states of both “knowing” and “avoiding knowing,” – 
central to our current understanding of unconscious processes – was then considered 
impossible. There did exist a modicum of dissenting opinion within the field: a number of 
lines of thought comprising the “New Look” – those who deemed plausible the idea that 
attitudes, values, wishes, needs, fears, expectancies, and psychodynamic defenses affect 
our perception of external stimuli (Erderlyi, 1974). For these scholars, the contention, 
“that certain inputs reach unconscious levels of registration and identification but are 
blocked from conscious perception” (Erderlyi 1974, p.2) was reasonable.  
The evolving picture. For decades, trends in scientific inquiry relegated the 
unconscious to the fringes of academic psychology; it remained controversial at best, 
ignored at worst, with those ‘in the know’ unable to “prove” what they knew. Until 
recently, unconscious processing, largely associated with the psychoanalytic tradition, 
lacked the backing of sound scientific data. However, neuroscience, with its increasing 
ability to find brain correlates of unconscious processes, has come to the empirical rescue 
of psychoanalysis (Yingling, 2001; Stein, Solms & van Honk, 2006, Spence et al. 2009). 
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This has enabled concepts of the unconscious to gain legitimacy in eyes of the larger 
psychological, psychiatric and medical communities. Today, owing in large part to 
advances in neuroimaging technology and research in cognitive and affective 
neuroscience, there is abundant empirical evidence for the phenomenon of unconscious 
processing.  
A contemporary neuroscientific perspective. Marie Vandekerckhove along 
with Jaak Panksepp, leaders and pioneers in the field of affective neuroscience, recently 
put forth an incredibly thorough, complex, but well articulated, formulation of the layers 
of consciousness (with a central focus on the unconscious end of the continuum) 
(Vandekerckhove & Panksepp, 2009). Although the depth and breadth of their work is 
well beyond the scope of this research, their conclusions/assertions are invaluable in 
framing the theoretical position of the current study. The first, as alluded to above, is that 
consciousness exists on a continuum. That is, there are many degrees of knowing and 
unknowing. Consequently, any time the unconscious is referred to in broad strokes, it is 
being referenced as a grand oversimplification (useful, and even necessary as that 
oversimplification may be at times).  
To be more precise, Vandekerckhove and Panksepp refer to a “continuum of 
stages,” and dedicate themselves to mapping out at least 3, distinct, global levels of 
consciousness – anoetic, noetic and autonoetic – with multiple sub-levels within each. 
Anoetic, a term they credit to neuroscientist Endel Tulving, refers to consciousness that is 
“purely experiential and unreflective.” It is most relevant to our discussion because it 
may overlap with much of what we casually call unconscious. In their conceptualization, 
the  
   11!
…unreflective anoetic form of consciousness…is ultimately a mixture of 
primary-process affective and sensorial-perceptual-cognitive experiences 
that are…critically important for the creation of emergent implicit 
procedural memories. In other words, anoetic consciousness is the bridge 
that may take us from deeply unconscious information-processing and 
primary-process consciousness (raw experience) toward the possibility of 
a dynamic cognitive unconscious and then consciousness which is 
probably largely situated within higher regions of the brain such as the 
neocortex.  (p. 3, 2009) 
One corollary of what they describe as “gradients from unknowing to knowing” (p. 3) is 
the difficulty of differentiating between what is unconscious and what is merely 
unattended to. The complexity of this distinction cannot be underestimated and 
consequently not much is known about how and when thoughts or affective states could 
be detected if pointed out or focused on in a particular way.  
Priming. One way in which implicit or unconscious processes are empirically 
studied – and have been validated – is through the use of priming paradigms (Slipp, 
2000). To “prime” is to present an earlier stimulus that influences a response to a later 
stimulus. Priming has been a hot topic in the psychological literature since the mid-
1960’s, with a strong focus on subliminally presented stimuli. Subsequent research has 
used various forms of priming to illustrate the influence of implicit or unconscious 
processes on decision-making and behavior.  
Subliminal priming is the oldest and most reliable way psychologists have 
demonstrated the existence of unconscious mechanisms. When a stimulus that is 
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presented subliminally (too briefly for it to be consciously detected) induces behavioral 
or emotional change, this change is attributed to unconscious processing. The utility of 
traditional subliminal priming paradigms has been exponentially enhanced by 
advancements in neuroimaging technologies (e.g., event-related fMRI), The ability to 
simultaneously measure brain activity is a robust method by which to explore and 
evidence neurophysiological correlates of unconscious processing (e.g. Ortigue et al., 
2007; Kouider et al., 2009)  
However, priming does not need to be subliminal for it to exert its influence 
outside of awareness and effect people’s behavior or judgments; supraliminal priming 
can also be “implicit” (exerting its influence outside of conscious awareness). Westen 
(2007) terms this “functionally subliminal” (p. 59), to suggest that as long as people don’t 
know that a stimulus is influencing them, they will not employ conscious strategies to 
attempt to counteract that influence. In fact, it has been systematically shown that, if 
people are unaware of a stimulus aimed at influencing them, subliminal and supraliminal 
exposures have the same effect (Dijksterhuis, Aarts & Smith, 2005).  
Having attended to the theoretic and scientific foundations of the unconscious, I 
now turn to mechanisms related to (and implicated in) unconscious processing, in 
particular affect and language.  
Affective Processes 
One of the long-standing quandaries of psychology, and, in another language, 
philosophy, involves the complex and illusive relationship between thoughts and 
feelings: which comes first, cognition or emotion? To what extent are we affectively 
driven? How can we best use our cognitive thought processes to achieve our goals? Freud 
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wrestled with the interplay of cognition and emotion in his structural theory of the mind. 
Other thinkers (e.g., James, Lange, Cannon, Bard, Schachter, Zajonc) also developed 
theories in this realm. Modern neuroscience research has been able to shed light on this 
topic through progressive understanding of brain processes. So too, have modern 
psychological researchers through innovative laboratory studies. Thus, the relationship 
between cognition and emotion may no longer be the riddle it once was. 
Converging evidence points to emotion as the most salient motivator of human 
behavior. It is a fallacy to assume that the cognition precedes the emotion merely because 
it may seem to us that our thoughts cause us to feel a certain way. Although we have 
some ability to use conscious thought to direct our emotions and actions, it is more 
accurate to say that emotional processes drive us—that emotion precedes thought, with 
thought serving as a moderating variable.  
The human brain is an emotional brain. It is increasingly argued that, in fact, 
even the common dichotomization of thought (cognition) and feeling (emotion) may be 
artificial and misleading (Siegel, 1999, p. 123). According to Siegel, among others, “the 
entire brain can be considered ‘emotional’” (1999, p. 142). This contention is true 
neurobiologically—the demarcation between functional structures in the brain is less 
boundaried than we were previously led to believe. Panksepp (2008) confirms that “there 
is no unambiguous biological dividing line between the amygdala and the many brain 
areas with which it communicates,” (p. 51) and explains that the amygdala is a “heuristic 
simplification” (p. 49). The same can be said of the “limbic system” (and likely most 
other areas of the brain of which we speak at present). In other words, the amygdala and 
limbic system are concepts created to facilitate communication about neuroanatomy; 
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necessary, but with the caveat that the brain is exceedingly complex and our continual 
approximation of an understanding leaves much to be desired. As science evolves, so too 
do our terms; neuroscience has already exchanged the amygdala and limbic system for 
the “extended amygdala” and “extended limbic” system, reflecting this expanding scope 
of neurophysiological emotional processes.  
Language, affect and the brain. The power and ubiquity of emotional 
processing also involves linguistic mechanisms. Researchers, including Panksepp (2008), 
purport all communication, in one way or another, to be affective communication. 
Linguistic communication specifically, relies heavily on the affective system. In his aptly 
titled manuscript, “The Power of the Word May Reside in the Power of Affect” Panksepp 
writes, “If one’s purely cognitive arguments are divorced from the affective-rhetorical 
power of emotional convictions, one’s ability to understand language and to attract the 
cognitive attention of others suffers.” Behaviorally, Havas, Glenberg and Rinck (2007) 
have shown that people more quickly process and understand the meaning of a sentence 
when the speaker’s facial expression and sentence valence are matched than when there 
is an incongruence.  
A recent neuroscientific investigation (Foroni & Semin, 2009) has shown that 
language comprehension involves the simulation and recruitment of neural systems used 
for emotion (as well as action and perception). These researchers demonstrated that 
subliminally presented semantic stimuli (e.g. the word “laugh”) influenced affective 
judgments (in this case, ratings of the ‘funniness’ of a series of cartoons). They were also 
able to demonstrate that motor resonance plays a role in this process, further highlighting 
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the neurobiological connection between affect, language and bodily processes (Foroni & 
Semin, 2009).  
The primacy of affective and unconscious processing. Following the logic of 
Siegel (1992), if the entire brain is considered to be emotional, then the concept of mind 
(believed to be a product of the brain) can also be considered emotional in its entirety. 
This logic is thought to hold true, despite the subjective human experience of 
categorically segregated mental processes.1 Damasio’s (1994) revision of Descartes’ 
famous proposition “I think, therefore I am,” to “We are, and then we think,” (p. 248) 
reflects the primacy of our unconscious emotional (and bodily) states in defining the self, 
rather than our conscious awareness of our thinking. Panksepp (2008) makes the case for 
the preeminence of affect in Brain-Mind processes, arguing that raw emotional feelings 
are essentially “objectless” (p. 51). Although we believe that our thoughts come to us “in 
the moment,” our experience of the present is always time-delayed in relation to the 
unconscious, and it is likely that affective processes create and mediate our current 
conscious ‘state of mind’. Vandekerckhove and Panksepp (2009) argue for the primacy 
of affect, portraying its omnipresence in our mental lives, and especially its strong 
relation to our less knowing forms of consciousness: “…anoetic consciousness is heavily 
linked…to various subcortical emotional and motivational process-intrinsic affective 
value structures…” (p. 9) In light of abundant evidence of the omnipresent role of affect, 
it is puzzling that support for an “emotional unconscious” has lagged behind that for a 
“cognitive unconscious.”  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Again, Panksepp (2009) elevates us above the traditional and (somewhat artificial) notion of the mind and 
brain as separate entities. He prefers to use “Mind-Brain,” “Brain-Mind,” or even “MindBrain” 
interchangeably, denoting that we are discussing a fully unified concept with no residue of dualism.” p. 2!
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Affective and Unconscious Processes in Judgment and Decision-Making 
Pertinent to the current study, research has demonstrated the pre-eminent role of 
affect in directing attention and decision-making (Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson, 1999). 
Westen and colleagues (2002) have empirically shown that compromise formations are 
ruled more by affective constraints than by cognitive constraints. By experimentally 
manipulating cognitive constraints, (i.e., giving people false information related to their 
decision) they were able to show that affective constraints accounted for nearly all of the 
variance in people’s judgments, and that cognitive constraints only came into play when 
there was no strong associated affect related to the decision (Westen & Arkowitz, 2002). 
At the very least, they determined that “where affects are strong, cognitions will typically 
follow” (p. 86). 
Research has demonstrated that affect motivates our behavior and judgments even 
when we don’t consciously experience emotion. Winkielman and Berridge’s (2004) 
laboratory work makes, perhaps, the most compelling case for unconscious emotion. 
These researchers concluded that, “emotional processes may nevertheless drive the 
person’s behavior and physiological reactions, even while remaining inaccessible to 
conscious awareness” (p. 120). In one experiment, they presented angry, neutral or happy 
faces subliminally (embedded in a cognitive task in which participants had to classify a 
clearly visible neutral face as male or female) and then asked participants to try a novel 
lemon-lime beverage and evaluate how much they would pay for it. Participants primed 
with happy faces consumed more, and were willing to pay about twice as much for the 
drink, than those primed with angry faces. This was not accounted for by any affective 
reaction of which the participants were aware, as conscious emotional experiences 
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(whether assessed before or after the beverage task), were unrelated to priming condition. 
In other words, as assessed by a variety of self-report scales, participants did not report 
more positive feelings after the subliminally presented happy faces or more negative 
feelings after the angry faces. Nevertheless, their behavior was altered suggesting that the 
induced behavior was the result of an unconscious affective reaction.  
Van Honk, Peper, and Schutter (2005) further validate the concept of behavior 
being driven by unconscious affect, highlighting the occurrence of discrepant conscious 
and unconscious emotional experience. They found that, after a single dose of 
testosterone, participants showed significantly lower levels of fear-based responding on a 
masked emotional Stroop task (as compared to placebo), even though they did not 
consciously experience a reduction in anxiety, as assessed by multiple self-report 
measures (Van Honk, Peper, & Schutter, 2005). It is perhaps easier to imagine the 
opposite situation – people responding in fear-based ways while reporting no conscious 
experience of that emotion; it appears that the reverse can be true as well. 
Within the field of social cognition, researchers have used brain imaging to 
explore the neural circuitry of unconscious social evaluation, providing neurobiological 
support for the already established finding that unconscious attitudes toward social 
groups affect behavior in subtle and often unintentional ways (e.g., Fazio et al, 1995, 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Chen & Bargh 1997; Phelps, et al., 2000). Elizabeth Phelps 
and colleagues studied amygdala activity while White American participants viewed 
pictures of Black and White unfamiliar male faces with neutral expressions. They found 
that strength of amygdala activation was significantly associated with unconscious racial 
bias (detected on two indirect measures – the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald 
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et al., 1998) and the magnitude of eyeblink startle responses to Black and White faces). 
Interestingly, this relationship did not exist with conscious racial bias – when racial 
attitudes were expressed directly on the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). 
Priming Identity and Values  
The remainder of the chapter will highlight particular studies that show the effects 
of priming identity, schemas and values – larger constructs that nonetheless draw on the 
same affective and unconscious processes to direct decision-making and judgment. More 
specifically, research on these specific mechanisms will touch upon data from the 
political arena, and consequently provide a cogent preparation for a discussion of this 
research – namely, the examination of unconscious processes in political judgment.   
Studies which employ identity priming can be found across various fields, 
including marketing, business management, social psychology, and behavioral decision-
making. With the recognition that people’s self-concept is usually comprised of multiple 
identity dimensions pertaining to different, and often conflicting sets of values, beliefs 
and ideals, it naturally follows that decision-making can be contextually influenced by 
the particular identity construct that is salient at the time of the decision. This model of 
identity is consistent with a psychodynamic view of personality. 
In their seminal study on stereotype threat, Steele and Aronson (1995) 
demonstrated that, for African American students, priming racial identity induced poorer 
performance on tests of intellectual ability. Simply positioning demographic questions at 
the beginning of the test lowered the scores of black students but not of white students; 
for the black students, the unconscious (or at least “functionally unconscious”) priming 
mechanism activated their anxiety about potentially confirming the negative stereotype 
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about how their racial group performs on standardized tests, consequently worsening 
their performance. The study, which unequivocally demonstrates the detrimental effects 
of stereotype threat, has since been replicated in various forms. Researchers at Montclair 
State University found that minority students scored higher on tests of cognitive ability 
when demographic questions were asked after rather than before the test (Kirnan et al., 
2009). In another study, Asian-American women performed better on a mathematics test 
when their ethnic identity was primed, but worse when their gender identity was primed 
(Shih, Pittinsky & Ambady, 1999).   
LeBoeuf, Shafir, and Belyavsky (2009) performed a series of studies on the 
effects of social identity priming on decision-making and consumer behavior, based on 
the premise of multiple and conflictual identity constructs that can be differentially 
activated through experimental manipulation. For example, in one study, these 
researchers hypothesized that undergraduate students possessed both social and academic 
components to their identities, and found that decision-making could be influenced by 
one or the other, depending on the situational context. They found that priming students’ 
“scholar” identity lead them to choose scholarly-congruent consumer items (e.g. The 
Wall Street Journal, Newsweek vs. USA Today, Sports Illustrated) more often than 
students whose “socialite” identities had been primed. Another study by these researchers 
explored the effects of ethnic identity priming in Chinese-American students. Results 
indicate that when students’ American identity was primed, they demonstrated 
significantly more individualistic preferences than when their Chinese identity was 
evoked (LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Belyavsky, 2009). Other research has also demonstrated 
effects of ethnic identity priming. For example, Forehand, Deshpandé, & Reed (2002) 
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found that ethnic identity priming increases a person’s liking of a same-ethnicity 
spokesperson.   
Political studies. Priming political identity has been shown to bias financial 
decision-making (Morris, Carranza & Fox, 2008), and in explaining the effect, these 
researchers identified a “linguistic–resonance” mechanism that operates separately from, 
and perhaps more powerfully than, the identity related values activated by the priming 
condition. Specifically, they conducted four related studies in which participants were 
asked about their party affiliation (Democrat versus Republican) and candidate 
preference in the 2004 presidential election (Bush versus Kerry), (priming condition) and 
then asked to choose between a low and high risk gamble or investment (dependent 
variable). The authors found that when political identity was made salient, Republicans 
were more inclined to choose a gamble or investment labeled “conservative” (versus 
“risk-tolerant”). Note that participants were not primed for ideological identification – the 
word “conservative” was not actually used in the priming questions but presumably held 
a close enough associative link to individuals’ Republican identity to influence their 
choices in the experiment. No effect was observed for Democratic participants. 
(However, one could hypothesize that had the financial options been labeled “liberal” 
versus “risk-aversive,” a comparable bias might have been observed in the Democrats 
studied.)  
In this same study, two findings are of particular interest: first, that Republicans 
chose the gamble/investment labeled conservative, regardless of whether that choice 
actually held lower risk, and second, when the financial options were not labeled, 
Republicans were equally likely to choose the high or low risk option. These results led 
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the authors to conclude that the priming effect was due to the activation of identity-
related language (the group label “conservative”) and not identity-related values. The 
authors submit that, beyond merely activating associated values, calling attention to 
identity categories primes for linguistic content associated with that group’s identity 
(labels, words, characteristic phrases). They cite this “linguistic-resonance” mechanism 
as potentially dangerous in that it can lead to arbitrary choices based on superficial 
labels—labels related linguistically but not substantively to the identity that was 
activated. 
Weise et al. (2008) demonstrated that priming attachment security can influence 
endorsement of extreme military tactics, and to their surprise, this effect was independent 
of political orientation. In this case, they primed participants with a secure attachment 
relationship by asking the participant to think of person in their life who accepts them for 
who they are without judgment. Whether they identified themselves politically as 
conservative or liberal, participants who were primed with a secure attachment 
relationship showed less support for the use of extreme military tactics. The authors’ 
explanation of this finding is of particular significance with respect to influence and 
judgment in politics: they note, cultural worldviews are complex, often containing 
conflicting elements, and which element (value, belief) is activated can motivate different 
political attitudes.   
Bryan et al. (2009) began with a similar assumption – that individuals hold a mix 
of values and beliefs and that the particular schemas that are activated at the time they 
make an evaluation can influence how they judge political issues. In this case, 
undergraduate students were primed with either a “Personal Merit schema,” (based on 
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conventional conservative ideology) or a “Good Fortune schema” (reflecting 
conventional liberal ideology) and asked to make judgments on various socio-political 
issues (e.g. building more prisons, toughening restrictions on unemployment benefits, 
universal guaranteed health care, affirmative action, instituting gifted tracks in 
elementary schools.) Participants were primed by being directed to write a paragraph 
about their own success (having been accepted to a highly selective university), focusing 
on the role of wise decisions, hard work and self-discipline (Personal Merit condition) or 
focusing on the role of chance, opportunity and help from others (Good Fortune 
condition). As predicted, following the priming task, participants in the Personal Merit 
condition endorsed more conservative positions on the political judgment questionnaire 
than those in the Good Fortune condition. Even after factoring in the effect of 
participants’ self-identified ideology, schema priming significantly predicted participants’ 
political judgments. The authors view this as evidence of a more malleable, dynamic 
component of political thinking.  
Conclusion 
The psychological principles outlined in this chapter help explain how people 
make decisions and form opinions. Namely, people are ruled more by affective processes 
than by cognitive ‘rational’ thinking, and most of those processes occur outside of 
awareness. As with all interdisciplinary research, this chapter drew from a variety of 
fields, aiming to contextualize and provide support for the current study. To that end, care 
was taken to organize and assimilate the research cited through the reconciliation of 
minor between-field differences (e.g., field specific terms and language). With this 
relevant literature base in tow, I now describe this study’s methodology. 




Overview   
Through anonymous questionnaires, a cross-sectional sample of adults in New 
York City was asked to rate their preference for hypothetical political candidates and 
their positions after being presented with identical written policy statements that varied 
only in the emotional quality of their introductory sentences. The political messages 
contained liberal and conservative policy positions on two issues relevant to present 
political discourse in the U.S.—immigration reform and climate change.  
Participants 
Participants consisted of English-speaking adults (18 years or older), who were 
approached in public and asked to fill out short questionnaires.  
Procedure 
Method of recruitment. Recruitment took place at 5 different New York City 
locations. Individuals were approached by the primary investigator or a trained research 
assistant and asked to fill out a questionnaire, using a standard script. Participation 
involved only the completion of an anonymous written questionnaire, with responses that 
could in no way be used to identify participants.  
To maximize participation, recruitment occurred in places where people choose to 
linger or must wait (e.g. train station) for sizeable periods of time. Locations were in 
Manhattan except when noted and included (1) outdoor and indoor plazas in the financial 
district, (2) Union Square Park, (3) Staten Island Ferry (travels back and forth between 
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Staten Island and downtown Manhattan), (4) Bryant Park, and (5) Grand Central Station. 
Although this was a convenience sample, locations were selected to maximize the 
diversity of respondents’ political orientation, within the constraints of the partisanship of 
the New York City population.  
The primary investigator and trained research assistants were responsible for data 
collection. To the extent possible, people were approached at random, with a conscious 
intent to maximize the diversity of age and race in the sample. Potential participants were 
invited to participate using the following script: “As part of a dissertation project at City 
College, I am studying the psychology of political decision making and would appreciate 
your completing a survey, which will take about 10 minutes of your time. We’re 
interested in getting input from people of every political viewpoint.” Individuals who 
agreed were provided with the consent form, questionnaire and a pen.  
  Participants were provided with a consent form that explained the study 
procedure, risks, benefits, confidentiality, and voluntary nature of participation, and that 
provided contact information for the IRB and the principal investigators. We did not ask 
for written consent in order to preserve the participants’ anonymity – the form spelled out 
that filling out the anonymous questionnaire is an expression of consent, and participants 
were given a copy to take with them. A 2nd copy of the consent form allowed participants 
to provide their name and e-mail address should they wish to receive information about 
the overall study results. The copies of the consent form were immediately placed in a 
separate folder, ensuring that the names and e-mail addresses were not be associated with 
the questionnaires, which remained completely confidential. 
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Questionnaire. The questionnaire, which takes about 10 minutes to complete, 
consists of two sections. The first section contains 4 paragraph-long statements 
(“messages”) made by hypothetical candidates for public office. After each message, the 
participant is asked to rate how much s/he agrees with the statement and how likely s/he 
would be to support this candidate. Ratings are made on a 0-10 point scale. The second 
section contains 11 questions regarding respondents’ demographic and political profile.  
  Messages. Messages pertained to two issues relevant to current political discourse 
in the U.S. – energy and immigration reform. On each issue, participants read a 
conservative policy message and a liberal policy message. Messages were constructed 
based on (a) relevant statements made by Democratic and Republican politicians, and (b) 
messages developed and tested by experienced political consultants and strategists 
(Westen Strategies, LLC, and Lake Research Partners) that include emotionally 
compelling, values-laden language or more rationalistic statements introducing the same 
policy positions.  
 Other questionnaire items. Following the messages, there were two pages of 
questions (11 items total) in which respondents selected answers from a set of pre-
determined options. Phrasing for these questions was based was based on the language 
used in the American National Election Studies (ANES) 
(http://www.electionstudies.org/) surveys. The only exception was an exploratory item on 
political involvement, based on the researchers’ interest.  
 Demographic questions. Participants were asked to provide information on their 
gender, age, marital status, level of education, racial/ethnic background, and household 
income.  
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  ‘Politico’ questions. Three items pertained to general level of political knowledge 
and involvement. Participants were asked to rate how interested they had been in the 
political news this year (“very much,” “somewhat,” “not very”). As an additional proxy 
for political awareness, they were asked to select how many days in the past week they 
consumed political news (“none,” “1-2,” “3-5,” “6-7.”) A question on political 
involvement listed 10 forms of political action (e.g. “taken part in a demonstration, 
protest, boycott or march concerning a political issue”) and asked the participant to check 
which, if any, they had done over the last decade.  
  Partisanship and ideology questions. Political identification questions separately 
queried individuals’ ideological orientation and party affiliation. In the former, 
participants placed themselves on a liberal-conservative continuum scale ranging from 1-
7, and also had the option to select “Don’t know haven’t thought much about this.” The 
political partisanship question offered the following options: “Strong Republican, “Not so 
strong Republican,” “Independent-lean Republican,” “Pure Independent,” “Independent-
lean Democrat,” “Not so strong Democrat,” “Strong Democrat,” and “None of these 
labels describe me.”  
Study design 
  Each participant read messages containing the same 4 policy statements -- a 
liberal and a conservative statement on immigration reform, and a liberal and a 
conservative statement on energy policy (Appendix A). However, the overall message 
paragraphs differed in their introductions. Each message began with either a values-
laden, emotionally compelling introduction or a more rationalistic, non-affective 
introduction. These constitute the priming manipulation and serve to create the 
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experimental conditions hereafter referred to as, “affective” and “non-affective.” The 
design was randomized such that half the participants read the affective version and half 
read the non-affective version of each message. The order of message presentation was 
balanced across participants.   
  Priming manipulation. A brief introduction was inserted before the policy 
statement was varied with the intent to prime values through emotionally evocative 
language. In the case of energy messages, in the “affective” priming condition, 
respondents read the following: 
 There’s nothing more important that we can do for our national security, our 
economy and the earth we leave our children than to end our dependence on 
foreign oil. Freedom, independence and self-sufficiency are the heart of who 
we are as a nation, and they should be at the heart of a robust strategy for 
energy independence in the 21st century.  
In the “non-affective” priming condition, this introduction was replaced with the 
following: 
To address our growing energy problems we need economically feasible policies 
that consider issues of energy production, distribution and consumption, taking 
into account relevant environmental factors. Ensuring future energy security for 
our nation means drawing upon the full range of energy sources, including 
alternatives.  
Appendix D contains the primes for the immigration policy statements.   
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Data Analysis 
Each participant read the same 4 policy statements (liberal energy, conservative 
energy, liberal immigration, and conservative immigration), allowing for within-subjects 
as well as between-subjects comparisons. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were used 
whenever possible to take advantage of the increase in power associated with reduced 
error variance. Initial steps examined whether message ratings differed between the two 
issues and across each policy condition. The sample was parsed with regard to 
ideological orientation, and other political and demographic data were also considered. 
Results from this portion of the analysis lay the groundwork for test the main hypotheses 
by identifying factors likely to influence message ratings and potentially moderate the 
effect of the primes.  
  The data analytic plan was to test for overall priming effects using repeated 
measures analyses, looking at the difference in ratings for each participant. Energy and 
immigration messages ratings would be submitted to separate multivariate 2 x 3 x 2 
mixed design ANOVAs, in which priming condition (affective versus non-affective) and 
political party (Democrat, Independent, Republican) would serve as between-subjects 
variables and message ratings (liberal versus conservative) would serve as the within-
subjects variable.  
  However, a beneficial aspect of the study design - the use of the same primes for 
the liberal and conservative policy conditions within each issue - was unappreciated in its 
potential to confound the data analytic process. Within each issue, there was only one 
version of the affective introduction and one version of the non-affective introduction; 
therefore, participants who received the liberal policy paired with the affective prime 
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would receive the conservative policy paired with the non-affective prime and vice versa. 
Consequently, including prime condition as a variable in repeated-measures ANOVAs 
was not deemed appropriate; any effect of prime condition would be undetectable or, at 
the very least, obscured, as it inherently represented different conditions across the two 
policy messages. Hence, the effect of prime was tested separately for each dependent 
variable (liberal energy policy, conservative energy policy, liberal immigration policy, 
conservative immigration policy) using a fully between-subjects design. Initial one-way 
ANOVAs examined the effects of prime in the overall sample; these were followed by 
two-way factorial ANOVAs to investigate whether the impact of the primes varied by 
political group (Ideology and Party).  
The data analytic plan was further re-considered in light of the lack of 
independence between order of prime (first message read had affective/non-affective 
introduction) and order of policy (first message read was liberal/conservative policy) 
inherent in study design. Although order of message presentation and prime were both 
varied (for each issue, the messages and prime conditions were seen in equal proportions 
first and second), stimuli characteristics permitted only two possible combinations (four 
possible orders) in which the messages could be presented. All participants saw a 
conservative policy and a liberal policy for each issue, and all were exposed to both an 
affective and non-affective prime, but participants either read: (i) the affective liberal 
message followed by the non-affective conservative message, (ii) the non-affective 
conservative message followed by the affective liberal message, (iii) the affective 
conservative message, followed by the non-affective liberal message, or (iv) the non-
affective liberal message followed by the affective conservative message. Consequently, 
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half of the participants who read the "non-affective" conservative message, read it 
following the "affective" liberal message, and the other half did not; half of the 
participants who read the "affective" liberal message, read it following the "non-
affective" conservative message and half did not, and so on. Either a message was seen 
first - free from any preceding influence - or, if seen second, it necessarily followed a 
message that contrasted both in policy position and affective valence (to the extent that 
the prime set an affective tone to the message). There was no instance in which an 
"affective" liberal message was preceded by a "non-affective" liberal message, or in 
which an "affective" liberal message was seen following an "affective" conservative 
message.  
 Looking only at the ratings for the first message seen by participants, comprised 
the most “pure” test of priming, as this eliminated the potential confound of seeing a 
contrasting policy first. However, this analysis reduced the sample size by half, with a 
consequent loss in power to detect significant effects. Nonetheless, this approach to the 
data analysis – examining ratings separately for messages read first (and second) – was 
the only option for isolating the effect of prime.  
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CHAPTER IV  
Results  
 
Data were collected in New York City between April 10 and 29, 2012. The 
primary investigator and trained research assistants collected the data across 6 days. Of 
the individuals who were approached and invited to participate, the response rate was 
48% (50% for females, 47% for males). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Incomplete questionnaires (less than 50% filled out) were not included in the 
analyses. Questionnaires were also considered incomplete if the participant did not rate 
all four messages. In total, 12 cases were excluded for these reasons. For the majority of 
questionnaire items, omission rate ranged from 0% to 2%. The exceptions were questions 
pertaining to age and income, which participants left blank in much greater numbers: 
24% of sample (n = 87) did not report their age, and 7% (n = 24) did not disclose 
information on income. While this defies the logic of anonymous surveying, it bears an 
understandable relationship to the content of the questions, reflecting the sensitive nature 
of disclosing age and financial status in our society. Table 1 presents detailed information 
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Table 1.  
 
Demographic Characteristics of Sample 
 
Characteristic  Proportion of sample N 
Gender   
 Male .52 192 
 Female .46 167 
 Missing .02 8 
Age (years)   
 18 – 24 .20 72 
 25 – 33 .19 70 
 34 – 48 .20 72 
 49-83 .18 66 
 Missing .24 87 
Marital Status   
 Married .38 138 
 Widowed .01 .5 
 Divorced .07 24 
 Separated <.01 3 
 Never married .43 158 
 Partnered, not married .10 38 
 Missing <.01 1 
Education   
 0-11 years .02 7 
 High school graduate .11 39 
 Technical or vocational school beyond 
high school 
.04 13 
 2 years of college or less .09 34 
 2 years college (junior college) .05 20 
 More than 2 years of college/no degree .10 35 
 4-year college graduate .29 107 
 Post college education  .31 112 
Race/ethnicity   
 Black/African American .18 67 
 Asian/Pacific Islander .09 33 
 Native American/American Indian <.01 3 
 Hispanic/Latino .09 34 
 White/Caucasian .50 185 
 Mixed/Other .11 41 
 Missing .01 4 
Income   
 Less than $25,000 .16 60 
 $25,000-$34,999 .07 24 
 $35,000-$49,990 .14 51 
 $50,000-$74,999 .15 55 
 $75,000-$99,999 .11 39 
 $100,000-$149,999 .15 56 
 $150,000-$250,000 .11 39 
 $250,000 or more .05 19 
 Missing .07 24 
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 Demographic characteristics of the sample. The sample was evenly divided by 
gender. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 83 years old, with a mean of 36.2 years (SD 
= 13.86). Examined by cohort, respondents fell evenly into 4 age groups: young adult (18 
- 24 years), early adulthood (25 - 33 years), middle adulthood (34-48 years), and adults 
49 and over.  
Half of the sample identified as “White/Caucasian,” followed by “Black/African 
American” (18%), “Hispanic/Latino (10%) and “Asian/Pacific Islander” (9%). Eight 
percent of respondents selected “Other;” and nearly all of these write-in responses 
included multiple races and/or ethnicities. An additional 3% of respondents indicated 
mixed racial/ethnic background by selecting two or more of the listed categories. These 
two groups were combined for purposes of analyses. Only 3 participants identified as 
“Native American/American Indian”; this group could not be analyzed separately for 
psychometric reasons.  
The sample was highly educated: 60% (n = 219) were college graduates and of 
these, more than 50% had completed some post-graduate education (31% of total 
sample). This is not surprising given the inherent bias of the sampling locations. Twenty 
eight percent (n = 102) of participants had completed some college, technical or 
vocational school. Only 7 individuals (< 2%) had not completed high school; three of 
these individuals were 18 years old.  
Median income was between $50,000-$74,999. Overall, individuals with 
household income > $100,000 constituted nearly a third of the sample (n = 114). 
Approximately one quarter of the sample fell in the middle-income range of $50,000-
$99,000. The remainder (37% of the total sample) reported a family income of less than 
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$50,000. Although high-income earners were overrepresented compared to the 
population of New York City at large, the data are consistent with our sampling locations. 
In addition, income data should be interpreted cautiously, given the wording of the 
question and the age range of the sample- “total family income from all sources” may 
have been interpreted differently, particularly in the “young adult” age-group, depending 
on whether they still resided with their family of origin.   
Political profile of the sample. Participants were asked questions pertaining to 
general level of political knowledge, interest and involvement; full data are provided in 
Table 2. The large majority of respondents reported having a high or moderate level of 
interest in politics, suggesting a possible inclusion bias of the study. A combined 89% of 
respondents (n = 323) described themselves as either  “very much” or “somewhat” 
interested in the political news. Similarly, the sample reported a high frequency of 
consuming of political news in the past week: 35% of respondents selected “6-7 Days” (n 
= 127), followed by 33% who selected “3-5 days” (n = 120), 22% who selected “1-2 
days” (n = 82), and 9% who selected “none” (n = 33). Regarding political participation, 
64% of the sample reported voting in national elections and 50% in local elections. 
Twenty three percent had been involved in active protest of some sort (e.g. 
demonstration, protest, boycott) in the last 10 years. Further data pertaining to political 
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Table 2.  
 
Political Profile of Sample 
 
Characteristic  Proportion of sample n 
Days of news consumption in past week    
 None .09 33 
 1-2 days .22 82 
 3-5 days .33 120 
 6-7 days .35 127 
 Missing .01 5 
    
Interest in the political news so far this year    
 Not much interested .11 42 
 Somewhat interested .43 156 
 Very much interested .46 167 
 Missing <.01 2 
    
Specific forms of involvement    
 Signed a written or email petition about a political or social issue .46 167 
 Participated in online political discussions .21 76 
 Contacted a newspaper or magazine to express your opinion on an issue  .14 51 
 Attended a public forum or government meeting .29 107 
 Called in to a radio or television talk show to express your opinion on a political issue .04 16 
 Contributed time or money to a political campaign .27 99 
 Taken part in a demonstration, protest, boycott, or march concerning a political issue .23 84 
 Contacted an elected official by telephone, letter, email or in person .27 97 
 Voted in most national elections .64 233 
 Voted in most state and local elections .50 184 
    
Total involvement   
 Endorsed 0 forms of involvement .14 50 
 Endorsed 1 form of involvement .19 70 
 Endorsed 2 forms of involvement .14 53 
 Endorsed 3 forms of involvement .13 47 
 Endorsed 4 forms of involvement .13 48 
 Endorsed 5 forms of involvement .08 28 
 Endorsed 6 forms of involvement .09 32 
 Endorsed 7 forms of involvement .04 13 
 Endorsed 8 forms of involvement .03 11 
 Endorsed 9 forms of involvement .02 6 
 Endorsed 10 forms of involvement .01 4 
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 Ideological orientation. Participants identified their ideological orientation on a 
7-point spectrum from “Extremely liberal” to “Extremely conservative,” with an 
additional option to select “I don’t know, haven’t thought much about this” (See Figure 
1).  Collapsing the 7 categories into 4 groups (liberal, moderate, conservative and “don’t 
know”), 44% of participants (n = 158) described themselves as liberal, 25% as moderate 
(n = 90), 22% as conservative (n = 81) and 9% (n = 34) selected “I don’t know, haven’t 
thought much about this.” The “I don’t know, haven’t thought much about this” group 
was excluded from analyses in which ideological orientation was an independent 
variable, as the group’s responses, compared to other defined groups, were erratic and 
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Figure 2. Pie chart showing percentages of sample across ideological groups 
 
Party affiliation. Participants’ self-identified party affiliation was also measured 
on a spectrum, to gather data on both the nature and strength of political partisanship 
(Figure 3). Thirty-eight percent of the sample (n = 140), identified as clearly partisan; of 
this group, 77% were Democrats (n = 108), and 23% were Republican (n = 32). Another 
30% of the sample (n = 109) identified as “Independent-leaning” - 68% toward the 
Democratic party (n = 74) and 32% toward the Republican party (n = 35). Combined, this 
is approximately a 3:1 ratio of Democrats to Republicans. Of those who did not identify 
with either party, 11% (n = 39) identified as “Pure Independent” and 19% of respondents 
(n = 71) selected “none of these labels describe me.” Figure 4 presents the breakdown of 
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Preliminary Analyses of Message Ratings: Issues and Policies  
Participants were asked to rate the messages in two regards - first, how much they 
agreed with the statement they just read, and second, how likely they would be to support 
the hypothetical candidate for office. The two questions were hypothesized to address 
overlapping, but somewhat discrepant, concepts. The first was considered a more global 
assessment of participants’ reaction to the message; the second, a judgment about the 
particular message combined with the relative weight of the political issue in the 
participant’s voting behavior (e.g. if they had a positive response to the message but the 
overall issue was not very important to them, then they might rate the first high and the 
second low). Preliminary analyses revealed that these the two ratings were identical in 
53% - 56% of cases, in more than 80% of cases the ratings differed by no more than 1 
point, and that, across the four policy statements, correlations ranged from .90 to .92 (p <. 
.01 for all). Exploratory analyses of the discrepancy between the two ratings for each 
message suggested ways in which they differ, but the study lacked the requisite power to 
examine the nuances of these differences. Therefore, in primary analyses, the first rating, 
thought to be a more pure, immediate (less modulated) evaluation of the message, was 
employed as the dependent variable. 
Overall sample. Mean ratings for all policy statements are presented in Table 3 
(along with the same statistics with the sample parsed by ideological group). In the 
overall sample, the liberal energy policy received the highest ratings (M = 7.7, SD = 2.1), 
and had the largest negative skew of the statements. The conservative immigration policy 
received the lowest ratings (M = 4.9, SD = 3.22) by a large margin; the next lowest was 
the conservative energy policy with mean of 6.2 (SD = 2.86).  
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Message ratings were submitted to a fully within-subjects 2 (Issue: energy, 
immigration) x 2 (Policy: liberal, conservative) ANOVA (Table 4) to examine whether 
there were differences in ratings between the two issues, and according to policy position. 
Main effects, with large effect sizes, were seen for both factors, revealing that: (i) the 
overall sample gave more favorable ratings to the energy messages than the immigration 
messages (ME = 7.0, SE = .093, 95% CI [6.8, 7.2]; MI = 5.9, SE = .129, 95% CI [5.6, 
6.1]), and (ii) the sample responded more positively to the liberal policies than to the 
conservative policies (ML = 7.2, SE = .091, 95% CI [7.1, 7.4]; MC = 5.6, SE = .135, 95% 
CI [5.4, 5.9]).  
Political groups. To analyze whether political identification moderated the 
findings presented above, ideological orientation (hereafter referred to as “Ideology”) and 
party affiliation (hereafter referred to as “Party”) served as between-subjects grouping 
factors in separate three-way mixed-design ANOVAs with Issue (energy, immigration) 
and Policy (liberal, conservative) as within-subjects factors. Results from the 3 (Ideology: 
liberal, moderate, conservative) x 2 (Issue: energy, immigration) x 2 (Policy: liberal, 
conservative) ANOVA are presented in Table 5. An analogous three-way ANOVA for 
Party yielded comparable results in terms of significance testing and effect sizes. Unless 
otherwise noted, findings reported below regarding Ideology align with those for Party in 




   41!
Table 3.  
Mean message ratings as a function of issue (energy vs. immigration), policy (liberal vs. conservative) and ideological group (liberal, 
moderate, conservative. 
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Table 5.  
ANOVA Table: Three-way mixed-design ANOVA for message ratings 
 
Source     SS  df  MS  F  p  !p2 
Between-Subject           
   Ideology    221.19  2  110.59  9.65  <.001  .056 
   Within-group error   3737.34 326  11.46 
 
Within-Subjects 
 Issue     311.47  1  311.47  51.72  <.001  .137 
 Issue x Ideology   153.10  2  76.55  12.71  <.001  .072 
   Issue x Subject (error)  1963.39 326  6.02 
  
 Policy    571.06  1  571.06  92.86  <.001  .222 
 Policy x Ideology   363.97  2  181.98  29.59  <.001  .154 
 Policy x Subject (error)  2004.82 326  6.150 
  
 Issue x Policy   8.933  1  8.933  2.269  .133  .007 
 Ideology x Issue x Policy   44.58   2  22.29  5.662  .004  .034 
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The Ideology x Issue x Policy ANOVA (Table 4) yielded significant effects for 
all three factors, for two of three possible two-way interactions, and for the three-way 
interaction. Here, the main effects for Issue and Policy are redundant with findings 
reported above regarding the overall sample hence the interactions are of primary 
theoretical interest. The significant main effect of Ideology shows that ideological groups 
differed with respect to overall positivity of ratings, such that conservatives gave the 
highest ratings (MC = 7.0, SE = .188, 95% CI [6.6-7.4], followed by moderates (MM = 
6.4, SE = .178, 95% CI [6.1-6.8]), and then liberals (ML = 6.0, SE = .135, 95% CI [5.7-
6.2]). Post hoc tests (LSD) revealed that each group differed significantly from one 
another, though, as seen in the marginal means, the greatest difference was between the 
liberal and conservative group. Yet, as noted, the significant two- and three-way 
interactions qualify these results and follow-up tests to more closely pinpoint and 
accurately describe the nature of the relationship between issue and policy position.   
Examining each policy statement separately according to political group, the 
liberal energy policy was the highest rated message for the both the liberal and moderate 
groups (Table 3), as well as for the Democrat (M = 8.3, SD = 1.71), Leaning Democrat 
(M = 8.4, SD = 1.51), Independent (M = 7.2, SD = 2.41) and No Labels groups (M = 7.7, 
SD = 2.19). The conservative immigration policy, on the other hand, was the lowest rated 
statement for the liberal and moderate groups, and all party groups except the 
Republicans (Democrat: M = 4.2, SD = 3.25, Leaning Democrat: M = 4.7, SD = 2.81, 
Independent: M = 4.8, SD = 3.62, Leaning Republican: M = 5.7, SD = 3.05 and No 
Labels: M = 5.0, SD = 3.25). Analysis of simple main effects for each dependent variable 
revealed an effect of Ideology for each of the four policy statements, (liberal energy: F(2) 
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= 68.98, p < .001, !p2 = .096, conservative energy: F(2) = 13.17, p < .001, !p2 = .075, 
liberal immigration: F(2) = 3.99, p = .019, !p2 = .024, conservative immigration: F(2) = 
21.12, p < .001, !p2 = .115). The pattern of means (conservative > moderate > liberal) 
existed for all but the liberal energy policy, which showed the reverse pattern. Post-hoc 
tests (LSD) revealed the following notable findings: in their ratings of conservative 
policies, all three ideological groups differed significantly from one another (p < .05), but 
in their ratings of liberal policies, liberals and moderates differed from conservatives (p < 
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 Issue x ideology interaction. The general pattern of the interaction between 
Ideology and Issue, shown in Figure 5, was confirmed by analyses of simple effects: 
Energy messages were strongly preferred in the liberal group, F(1) = 73.88, p < .001, !p2 
= .320, and the moderate group, F(1) = 25.65, p < .001, !p2 = .224, whereas the 
conservative group rated the issues equally overall, F(1) = .002, p = .96, !p2 = 00. 
Likewise, one-way ANOVAs testing simple effects for each issue revealed that groups 
showed equivalent liking for the energy messages, F(2) = .78, p = .459, !p2 = .005, but 
differed significantly in their ratings of the immigration messages, F(2) = 16.09, p < .001 
!p
2 = .09. For immigration ratings, mean ratings were 5.1 for liberals (SE = .189, 95% CI 
[4.8-5.2]), 5.9 for moderates (SE = .251, 95% CI [5.3-6.2]) and 7.0 for conservatives (SE 
= .264, 95% CI [6.5-7.5]). Post-hoc tests (LSD) indicate that conservatives rated the 
immigration messages significantly higher than liberals (p < .001) and moderates and 
moderates (p = .001), and that the difference between liberals’ and moderates’ ratings 
approached significance (p = .052).  
Policy x ideology interaction. To understand the main effect of policy, the initial 
three-way ANOVA was followed by splitting the file by issue and conducting two-way 
mixed-design ANOVAs with Policy (liberal, conservative) as the within-subjects factor 
and Ideology (Liberal, Moderate, Conservative) as the between-subjects factor. 
For the energy messages, there was a main effect of Policy F (1) = 39.97, p < 
.001, !p2 = .109, qualified by a significant Policy x Ideology interaction, F (2) = 30.11, p 
< .001, !p2 = .156. As seen in Figure 6, for the energy messages, the disordinal Policy x 
Ideology interaction represents the expected relationship between ideological orientation 
and policy preference: participants showed a preference for the policy that corresponded  
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Figure 6. Plot of significant policy x ideology interaction for energy messages 
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with their ideological orientation, such that those who identified as conservative rated the 
conservative policies higher and those who identified as liberal rated the liberal policies 
higher. Considering cell means (Table 3) and conducting simple effects analyses for each 
group separately, confirmed the liberals’ preference for the liberal policy, F(1) = 95.52, p 
< .001, !p2 = .378, the moderates’ preference for the liberal policy, F(1) = 28.01, p < 
.001, !p2 = .239, and the conservatives’ preference for the conservative policy F(1) = 
4.45, p = .038, !p2 = .053.  
For the immigration messages, the main effect of Policy F (1) = 78.27, p < .001, 
!p
2 = .194, was also qualified by a significant Policy x Ideology interaction, F(2) = 8.58, 
p < .001, !p2 = .050. However, in this case, the interaction (Figure 7) was not in the 
expected direction. Rather, for immigration, all three groups preferred the liberal policy, 
and the significant interaction term was due to the greater degree of preference among the 
liberal group, and secondarily the moderate group. Analysis of simple main effects show 
that this preference for the liberal policy reached significance for the liberal group, F(1) = 
81.77, p < .001, !p2 = .342, the moderate group, F(1) = 39.01, p < .001, !p2 = .305, and at 
a trend level for the conservative group, F(1) = 3.71, p = .058, !p2 = .044. Interestingly, 
although the liberals’ ratings of the two immigration policies differed to a greater degree, 
conservatives rated both policies higher than the other two groups. These findings were 
unexpected, as there was no hypothesized reason to expect that for immigration messages 
the conservative group would rate both the conservative and liberal policy statements 
higher than the other ideological groups. There was a between-subjects main effect of 
Ideology for the immigration messages, but not the energy messages (a finding redundant 
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with previously reported simple effects, showing that the groups differed in mean 
immigration ratings, but not in mean energy ratings). 
Three-way interaction and conclusions. Taken together, these preliminary 
findings suggest relevant differences between ideological groups (and political party 
groups) for the issues of energy and immigration reform and for the liberal and 
conservative policy conditions. The two-way interactions and follow up tests indicate a 
differential effect of ideological group for each issue and, within each issue, between the 
two policy conditions. Hence, the three-way interaction, interpreted as a difference in the 
two-way interactions at each level of the third variable, represents how the relationship 
between political group and policy preference differs for the topics of energy and 
immigration reform. Most importantly, these analyses show that all three factors – issue, 
policy condition and ideological orientation – influence message ratings, and could 
potentially obfuscate any effects of prime if averaged and not considered separately in 
subsequent analyses.   
Effect of Prime 
A number of findings from the preliminary set of analysis informed decisions 
about how to compare ratings for the affectively valenced introductions. In addition, 
some unanticipated consequences of the study design required consideration. As planned, 
energy and immigration messages were analyzed separately; the affective and non-
affective primes used for each issue were not the same, and would be an additional source 
of variability if combined in analyses. Findings regarding the differences in ratings 
between the issues, and particularly the interactions with political group, supported this 
decision. The discrepancy between ratings for each policy, and more importantly, the 
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nature of the interaction between Policy and Ideology (and the three-way Policy x Issue x 
Ideology interaction) cautioned against testing the effect of prime in a way that combined 
the liberal and conservative policies. Results from preliminary analyses confirmed the 
relevance of the relationship between political group and message ratings; thus, as 
planned, analyses were performed to examine whether the impact of prime varied 
according to political ideology or party affiliation.  
Overall sample. Ratings for messages seen first were submitted to one-way 
ANOVAs to examine the effect of prime in the sample at large. Of the four policy 
statements, the liberal immigration policy was the only one for which the effect of prime 
was significant, (F(1) = 6.22, p = .014, !p2 = .033. Contrary to prediction, in this case 
marginal means reveal that the sample gave less favorable evaluations to the liberal 
immigration policy in the affective condition (MA = 6.0, SE = .22, 95% CI [5.6, 6.4]), 
than in the non-affective condition (MN = 6.7, SE = .23, 95% CI [6.3, 7.2]).  
Relationship with political ideology. To investigate whether political ideology 
moderated the influence of the affectively valenced introductions, 2 (Prime: affective, 
non-affective) x 3 (Ideology: liberal, moderate, conservative) ANOVAs were conducted 
for each policy statement. These analyses did not reveal significant prime x ideology 
interactions for any of the policy statements. For the conservative immigration messages 
there was an inconsistency between p-value and effect size, such that the interaction term 
did not reach significance (p = .175), but showed a small estimated effect size (!p2 = 
.022). All other findings (regarding main effects of Prime and Ideology) are redundant 
with findings already reported. Combined, the results from these ANOVAs do not 
indicate that ideological orientation added any predictive value to impact of prime.  
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Relationship with political party. An analogous set of ANOVAs examined 
whether political party moderated the impact of the primes. For the purposes of these 
analyses, political party was parsed with regard to party and strength of party affiliation 
(Independent-leaning groups were considered separately). Independents and those 
participants who selected “None of these labels describe me,” were also included in the 
analyses as separate groups. Thus, the sample was divided into 6 groups: Democrat (D), 
Leaning Democrat (LD), Republican (R), Leaning Republican (LR), Independent (I), and 
No Labels (NL).  
 Results, reported in Table 6, suggest that Party (unlike Ideology) was related to 
the effect of prime, though differentially across the 4 policies. The prime x party 
interaction was significant for the liberal energy messages, and reached trend level 
significance for the conservative energy messages. These effects were both of medium 
size (!p2 =.064, .059, respectively). For the immigration messages, there was a 
discrepancy between the p-value and effect size in the prime x party interactions, such 
that calculations of the magnitude of effect suggested small effect sizes (!p2 =.028, .022) 
though p-values were nonsignificant. Since these effect sizes were for interaction terms, 
they were considered large enough to warrant further examination.  
To summarize, the data show notable differences in ratings based on prime condition 
within certain political party groups—differences, that in some cases, attained statistical 
significance (with large effect sizes), and in some cases, in spite of similar magnitudes of 
difference, did not. These prime x party interactions warranted follow-up testing; 
however, for the most part, the analyses did not have enough power to detect the effects 
of prime in political subgroups, on account of smaller sample sizes.  
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Table 6. 
ANOVA Table: 2 (Prime) x 3 (Party) factorial ANOVAs for all dependent variables  
Liberal Energy Policy 
Source     SS  df  MS  F  p  !p2 
   Prime    .872  1  .87  .23  .636  .001 
 Party     63.68  5  12.74  3.28  .007  .088 
 Prime x Party   44.94  5  8.99  2.32  .046  .064 
  Within-group error   659.24  170  3.88  
 
Conservative Energy Policy  
Source     SS  df  MS  F  p  !p2 
 Prime    1.07  1  1.07  .14  .708  .001 
 Party     57.77  5  11.55  1.51  .189  .044 
 Prime x Party   79.50  5  15.90  2.08  .070  .059 
  Within-group error   1260.56 165  7.64 
 
Liberal Immigration Policy           
Source     SS  df  MS  F  p  !p2 
   Prime    22.09  1  22.09  3.40  .067  .020 
 Party     56.77  5  11.35  1.75  .126  .050   
   Prime x Party   30.91  5  6.18  .952  .449  .028 
  Within-group error   1084.68 167  6.50 
 
Conservative Immigration Policy           
Source     SS  df  MS  F  p  !p2 
   Prime    10.05  1  10.05  1.01  .317  .006 
 Party     200.40  5  40.08  4.02  .002  .107 
 Prime x Party   38.52  5  7.70  .77  .571  .022 
  Within-group error   1676.41 168  9.98 
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Notwithstanding, observing some of the magnitudes of difference within particular 
political groups (Tables 7-10), tests of simple main effects were performed, with the 
awareness that only extremely large effect sizes would be detectable. Differences that did 
not attain significance will be discussed in instances in which there was a discrepancy 
between the p-value and the effect size. Non-significant results with standardized 
differences between means of moderate size or greater will be addressed, though should 
be interpreted with caution for the above-mentioned reasons.  
Differential effects of prime within party groups. Means and standard 
deviations for message ratings by party group and prime condition are presented in 





Due to unequal sample sizes and differences in within-group variances, the pooled 
standard deviation was calculated using the following formula: 
 
+%"!#!",$"$!-!+%$!#!",$$$" !$&''()*!%!! %"!-!%$!#!$! !
 
Liberal energy messages. There was a significant effect of prime in the Leaning 
Democrat group, F(1) = 8.04, p = .008, !p2 = .187, such that the affectively primed policy 
was rated higher (MA = 9.1, SD = .857) than the non-affective version (MN = 7.9, SD = 
1.66). The standardized difference between the means (g = .94) characterizes this as a 
large effect size (Cohen, 1988; Cohen, 1996; Rosenthal 1998).  The Independent group 
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also rated the policy more favorably when paired with the affective prime (MA = 8.2, SD 
= 1.72) than with its non-affective counterpart (MN = 6.9, SD = 2.85) with a slightly 
larger difference in mean ratings; however with the smaller sample size (NLD = 37 v. NI = 
16), this effect did not reach significance, F(1) = 1.42, p = .253, !p2 = .092. In spite of the 
discrepancy between p-value and effect size, the standardized difference between the 
means (g = .83) would be considered large in this group as well.   
In contrast, the Republican group rated the liberal energy policy higher when 
paired with the non-affective prime (MN = 7.7, SD = 1.90) than the affective prime (MA = 
5.7, SD = 3.39). The effect did not reach significance, F(1) = 2.64, p = .125, !p2 = .125 in 
this small group (N = 17), but is of notable magnitude, with a moderate to large effect 
size (g = .78). The Leaning Republican group showed the same pattern as the Republican 
group, but with a smaller magnitude of difference and small estimated effect size.   
Conservative energy messages. For the conservative energy policy, there was a 
very large effect of prime in the Republican group (g = 1.24), who rated the policy more 
favorably in the non-affective condition (MN = 8.9, SD = 1.29 vs. MA = 7.0, SD = 1.73), 
F(1, 14) = 5.82, p = .031, !p2 = .309, as they had for the liberal energy policy. Democrats 
also rated the non-affective message (MN = 7.1, SD = 2.48) higher than the affective one 
(MA = 5.6, SD = 3.02) though this difference only reached trend level significance, F(1) = 
3.13, p = .083, !p2 = .062, with moderate effect size (g = .50).  
In contrast, the Leaning Democrat group gave higher ratings to the affectively 
primed message (MA = 7.4, SD = 1.98, MN = 5.8, SD = 2.91), as did the Independent 
group (MA = 6.2, SD = 3.09, MN = 4.7, SD = 2.67). The effect was significant at the trend 
level for the Leaning Democrat group, F(1, 36) = 3.17, p = .084, !p2 = .083, with a 
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moderate effect size (g = .61). The magnitude of difference also approached moderate 
size for the Independent group (g = .49), but the effect did not obtain statistical 
significance.  
Liberal immigration messages. The liberal immigration messages showed a 
notable effect of prime for three of the groups – the Democrats, the Leaning Democrats, 
and the Leaning Republicans – and all three groups rated the policy higher in the non-
affective condition than the affective one. Of these groups, consistency between the p-
value and effect size was only achieved for the Leaning Democrats, F(1, 34) = 10.76, p = 
.002, !p2 = .246., with a considerably large magnitude of effect (g = 1.13). The other two 
groups had magnitudes of difference that approached medium size (Democrats, g = .46; 
Leaning Republicans, g = .47) but the effects did not reach statistical significance.  
 Conservative immigration messages. In comparison to the other policies, ratings 
of the conservative immigration policy showed the fewest differences based on prime 
condition. The Leaning Republicans were the only group in which there was an 
appreciable (g = 1.11) and significant, F(1, 14) = 5.27, p = .039, !p2 = .288, effect of 
prime. As with the liberal immigration policy, Leaning Republicans gave less favorable 
ratings to the policy it was paired with the affective prime, although this occurred to a 
much greater degree in this case of the conservative policy.  
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Table 7.  
 
Mean ratings for liberal energy message as a function of party affiliation (Democrat, Leaning Democrat, Independent, Leaning 
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Table 8.  
 
Mean ratings for conservative energy message as a function of party affiliation (Democrat, Leaning Democrat, Independent, Leaning 




Conservative Energy Message 
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Table 9.  
 
Mean ratings for liberal immigration message as a function of party affiliation (Democrat, Leaning Democrat, Independent, Leaning 




Liberal Immigration Message 
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Table 10.  
 
Mean ratings for conservative immigration message as a function of party affiliation (Democrat, Leaning Democrat, Independent, 
Leaning Republican, Republican, No Labels), prime condition (affective vs. neutral), and order (1st vs. 2nd). (Standard deviations in 
parentheses.)  
 
Conservative Immigration Message 
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 Exploratory analyses: order effects and interaction with prime. The study 
design involved a balanced order of message presentation, but there was no a priori 
hypothesis regarding the influence of order on message ratings. Nonetheless, interesting 
findings emerged when the “pure” effect of prime described above was compared with 
the effect of prime in messages read second (thereby with the potential of influence from 
the prior contrasting message). To test the effect of order, and specifically its interaction 
with prime, 2 (Prime: affective, non-affective) x 2 (Order: 1st, 2nd) ANOVAs were 
performed, followed by tests of simple effects of order and prime (for messages read 
second) when indicated. Due to the divergent effects of prime across political party 
groups, analyses were conducted separately for each group.  
Liberal energy messages. For the liberal energy messages there were no 
straightforward effects of order for any party groups; however, using the criteria 
described earlier, there were four groups for which the interaction between order and 
prime was noteworthy. The Leaning Democrat and Independent groups demonstrated the 
same pattern: both had rated the affective version more favorably than the non-affective 
version when seen first, but showed no difference based on prime condition when the 
liberal energy policy was seen second, (following a conservative energy message). For 
the Leaning Democrats, this interaction approached significance, F(1) = 3.73, p = .058, 
!p
2 = .051). For Independents, the strength of association was nearly the same (!p2 = 
.051) but the interaction did not attain significance, possibly on account of the much 
smaller sample size (NLD = 74 vs. NI = 39).  
Republicans showed a trend level disordinal interaction between order and prime, 
F(1) = 3.53, p = .071, !p2 = .112, such in the “pure” condition they rated the affective 
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version of the message less favorably than the non-affective version, but showed the 
reverse pattern when the message was read second. A follow-up test of prime in 
messages read second failed to attain significance, though the more positive evaluation of 
the affective version was of moderate size (g = .56). 
Lastly, seeing the message second appeared to increase the effect of the prime for 
the Leaning Republicans group: Leaning Republicans evaluated the affective version less 
positively whether the message was seen first or second; however, this difference was of 
greater magnitude (g = .85 vs. g = .27) when the message was seen second. This 
difference, and attained trend level significance, F(1) = 3.18, p = .096, !p2 = .185), in 
spite of the group’s small sample size (N = 16).  
Conservative energy messages. For the conservative energy messages, there was 
a straightforward order effect for only one group; three additional groups showed some 
relationship between order and prime. The Democrats were the group that showed a 
significant main effect of order F(1) = 4.54, p = .035, !p2 = .042, rating the conservative 
energy message higher when seen first (M = 6.3, SD = 2.85) than when seen second (M = 
5.2, SD = 2.85). There was no interaction with prime – in both cases, Democrats rated the 
non-affective version more favorably than the affective one, with similar trend level 
significance and moderate effect size (for messages seen second: F(1) = 2.87, p = .096, 
!p
2 = .048, g = .43).  
The relationship between order and prime is worth noting for the Leaning 
Democrat, Independent and Republican groups in spite of the inconsistency between p-
value and effect size in all three ANOVAs. The Leaning Democrats and Independents are 
of particular interest because these groups showed the same pattern for the conservative 
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energy messages as they had for the liberal energy messages: both groups evaluated the 
affective version of the conservative energy message more favorably than the non-
affective version in the “pure” priming condition, but showed no difference based on 
prime condition when the message was seen second. The effect of order, then, was to 
effectively erase the impact of the introductory sentences. For the Republican group, 
seeing the conservative message second also decreased the effect of the prime: 
Republicans evaluated the non-affective version more positively whether the message 
was seen first or second, but the magnitude of the difference was much less and no longer 
statistically significant when the message was seen second (though still of moderate size, 
g = .65). 
Liberal immigration messages. For the liberal immigration messages, order was 
implicated for three groups. There was a main effect of order for the Leaning Republican 
group, F(1) = 4.85, p = .035, !p2 = .135, such that the message was rated significantly 
lower when seen first (M = 6.7, SD = 2.52) than when seen second (M = 8.2, SD = 1.47). 
The relationship between order and prime is noteworthy, in that the group evaluated the 
affective version less positively than the non-affective version in the “pure” condition, 
but showed the reverse pattern when the message was seen second. Yet, in the two-way 
ANOVA, the interaction was not significant, with there was an inconsistency between p-
value and effect size, F(1) = 1.19, p = .283, !p2 = .037. Differences based on order were 
also seen in the Republican group, however, in contrast to the Leaning Republican group, 
liberal immigration messages were evaluated more positively when seen first (M = 7.9, 
SD = 2.56) than when seen second (M = 6.6, SD = 2.79). In spite of the moderate 
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standardized difference between means (g = .47), this effect also did not attain 
significance.  
As with the two energy messages, the Leaning Democrat group showed an effect 
of prime in the “pure” condition (non-affective > affective), but no difference based on 
prime condition when the message was seen second. This interaction was significant with 
moderate effect size, F(1) = 4.32, p = .041, !p2 = .058.  
Lastly, there was a relationship between order and prime for the Independent 
group, who had not shown an effect of prime in the “pure condition,” but who rated the 
non-affective version higher (M = 7.3, SD = 2.20) than the affective version (M = 5.0, SD 
= 3.69) when the message was seen second. The magnitude of this difference was large 
(g = .81) though statistical significance was only at a trend level, F(1, 19) = 3.02, p = .10, 
!p
2 = .144.   
Conservative immigration messages. Unsurprisingly, no group showed an effect 
of prime when the conservative immigration message was seen second. The Leaning 
Republicans, who had rated the non-affective version more favorably than the affective 
version when seen first, showed no difference based on prime condition when the 
conservative immigration policy was seen second. This interaction, notable for its 
discrepant p-value and effect size did not reach significance, F(1) = 2.78, p = .106, !p2 = 
.082. 
Conclusions. In sum, results do not support initial hypotheses regarding the 
impact of the affective and non-affective introductory sentences. The expectation that the 
primes would operate in a generalized way across groups and policy conditions was not 
borne out by the data. Findings contradict the prediction that the priming condition effect 
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would work in a simple fashion, by increasing ratings for all messages, regardless of 
policy condition or issue. Rather, what emerged was that the impact of the affective 
introductions depended on a host of factors, including issue and policy condition, and 
most notably, political party.  
Though results did not provide support for the study hypotheses, effects of prime 
were of moderate to large magnitude when differences were detected, providing ample 
evidence that the affective introductions have the potential to have substantial practical 
impact. The implications of these findings will be discussed in the following chapter, 
along with the noteworthy patterns with regard to order and its relationship with prime. 
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CHAPTER V  
Discussion  
 
This research investigated the effects of emotionally-valenced introductory 
sentences on judgments of public policy. It was hypothesized that individuals would give 
more favorable ratings to political messages when policy statements were preceded by 
values-based, affective introductory sentences than when introduced by parallel sentences 
with bland, less affective verbiage and that this would be true for persons across the 
political spectrum, independent of their initial attitude towards the subject. The affective 
introductions were expected to exert influence through priming; that is by evoking certain 
values and emotional associations that would generate more positive views toward the 
policy statements.  
As will be discussed below, none of the a priori hypotheses were borne out by the 
data. Rather, a more complicated picture emerged, whereby the primes had substantial 
impact but did not have the straightforward amplification effect that was expected. The 
effect of the introductory sentences varied according to the issue (energy vs. 
immigration), policy position (liberal vs. conservative), and political party affiliation. In 
addition, results indicated an impact of contrast, based on message order. Although the 
order of presentation was balanced, these effects had not been anticipated.  
Sample Characteristics 
Participants were evenly distributed across age and gender categories. There were 
several ways in which the sample was biased relative to the population of New York City 
(NYC) at large, while remaining consistent with the sampling locations. For instance, the 
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sample was more highly educated and had a higher median income. This was an arguably 
inevitable consequence of choosing specific sampling locations (certain areas of 
Manhattan, Staten Island) likely to have a higher percentage of conservatives and/or 
Republicans. There was also likely a self-selection bias in that people were more likely to 
participate if they were interested in politics.  
Sampling locations were chosen with the intent to maximize diversity of political 
ideological orientations and party affiliation and it appears this sampling goal was 
sufficiently achieved. Approximately 50% of the sample identified with the Democratic 
party, 18% identified with the Republican party, and 29% were not affiliated with either 
party (11%  “Pure independent,” 19% “None of these labels describe me”). With regard 
to political ideology, 43% of the sample described themselves as liberal, 25% as 
moderate, 22% as conservative, and 9% selected “Don’t know, haven’t thought much 
about this.” 
Comparisons with recent NYC polling data (CBS News, and The New York 
Times, 2012) suggest that the political identity of the present sample was representative 
of the NYC population. Proportions of partisans in the study sample are fairly congruent 
with those of an August, 2012, CBS News/New York Times poll that found 58% of 
respondents identified as Democrat, 14% as Republican, 19% as Independent, and 9% as 
“Don’t know/Not applicable.” Similarly, the sample’s ideological composition aligns the 
CBS News/New York Times poll, in which 37% of respondents identified as liberal, 32% 
as moderate, 21% as conservative, and 10% endorsed “don’t know/not applicable” (CBS 
News, and The New York Times, 2012). The CBS News/New York Times poll did not 
measure party affiliation or ideological orientation on a spectrum, but the overall 
   66!
comparison suggests that the present study captured the diversity of political 
identification within the heavily Democratic/liberal milieu of New York City as well as it 
could have.  
The sample’s political composition also comports with national trends in political 
party association that indicate a declining percentage of people who identify with the 
two-party system (Pew Values Survey, 2012). In the current sample, only 38% of the 
respondents endorsed a clear affiliation with either the Democratic or Republican party, 
30% of respondents described a weak association with one of the two parties 
(“Independent-leaning” groups), and 30% rejected any association whatsoever with the 
labels “Democrat” or “Republican.” The political characteristics of the sample support 
conclusions from the 2012 Pew Values Survey that, “fewer Americans [are] affiliating 
with one of the major parties than at any point in the past 25 years,” and that, “it is safe to 
say that there are more political independents in 2012 than at any point in the last 75 
years” (Pew Values Survey, 2012, p. 13). In terms of national trends, the Pew survey 
reports that the percentage of Democrats in the country has remained stable over the last 
two decades (33% in 1990, 32% in 2012), while the percentage of Republicans has 
decreased from 31% in 1990 to 24% in 2012. During this same period, the percentage of 
people identifying as Independent increased from 29% to 38%. Not addressed in the Pew 
polling, is whether this reflects a true shift in views/ideology or merely a change in desire 
to identify with the Republican label.  
Preliminary Analyses: Issues and Policies 
Judgments of energy and immigration in the overall sample. There was no 
specific hypothesis regarding differences in level of positive response toward the two 
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issues; however, data reveal that, in the sample at large, energy messages garnered more 
favorable responses from participants than immigration messages. Examined more 
closely, this appears to be due, in part, to a negative response to the conservative 
immigration policy—this message was rated significantly lower than the other three, and 
also differed in its distribution, with a substantially higher percentage of very low ratings. 
It thus appears that among a portion of the sample, the content of the conservative 
immigration policy produced an acutely negative response.  
The sample’s low ratings of the conservative immigration policy only partially 
account for the differential response to the two issues. Energy messages were evaluated 
more favorably than immigration messages even when the conservative immigration 
policy was excluded from the analysis. Looked at another way, when only the liberal 
messages were compared, energy policy was judged more positively than immigration 
policy. Thus, it remains that this New York City sample agreed more with the proposed 
energy policies than the immigration policies.  
 The above finding was related to political identity (that is, ideology and party) in 
that groups differed in their relative response to the two issues. Liberals and moderates 
responded more favorably to the energy messages than to the immigration messages, 
whereas conservatives did not show a difference in overall positivity toward the issues. 
Furthermore, groups differed in their general positivity toward immigration reform – 
conservatives’ judgments (of both the liberal and conservative policy) were more positive 
than their liberal and moderate counterparts’. Beyond political identity, several factors 
help interpret the sample’s more favorable response to the energy issue and its relative 
dislike of the conservative immigration policy. 
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Favorability of energy policies in light of NYC politics. The sample’s positive 
evaluation of the energy messages (and especially the liberal energy policy) is consistent 
with trends in NYC public opinion at the time of data collection. New York City is not 
representative of the rest of the country and leans heavily toward the liberal end of the 
spectrum regarding beliefs about energy reform and environmental policy. Available data 
suggest that NYC residents may even be to the left of Democrats elsewhere in the 
country in favoring increased energy regulation. A 2007 survey found that 84% of NYC 
residents agreed with the statement, “the City of New York should REQUIRE2 owners of 
existing buildings to make their buildings more energy efficient.” Moreover, 66% of 
those surveyed said they would support a “$2.50 surcharge on the average household’s 
monthly electric bill for a special fund to help make buildings more energy efficient and 
teach New Yorkers how to reduce their energy use.” 
Dislike of conservative immigration policy contextualized: national immigration 
politics. At the time of data collection (April, 2012), immigration reform3 was on deck to 
become a central topic for the nation at large, though the issue had not yet reached a 
crescendo. Public opinion polls taken within six months of this study’s data collection 
converge to show that most people (58-78%, depending on the poll) agreed with the 
general concept of a ‘path to citizenship’—that ‘illegal immigrants’ should be allowed 
“to remain in this country and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship,” providing they 
meet certain criteria (e.g. learn English, pass background check). This included majorities 
in so-called “red” (majority Republican) states. Important to the present study, only 19-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!verbatim from the survey 
3 It is important to clarify that while the phrase “immigration reform” technically applies to immigration 
policies of all sorts, in recent U.S. politics, “immigration reform” has been generally understood to refer to 
policies regarding “illegal immigration,” and thus will be used as such in the current study. !
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25% of the public (depending on the survey) supported “mass deportation”—sending “all 
illegal immigrants back to their home country” (See Americasvoiceonline.org, 2011 for 
summary of polls).  
In spite of the growing consensus in favor of a “path to citizenship” and against 
“mass deportation,” these policy points still showed the most division across party lines; 
hence, the study’s liberal and conservative policy statements reflected the two contrasting 
positions. In the liberal statement: “…politicians are not being honest if they say we can 
find and deport twelve million illegal immigrants. We need to…require those who came 
here without our permission to register…so we turn illegal immigrants into productive, 
tax-paying citizens.” In the conservative statement: “It means…tracking down those who 
overstay their visas…And it means that the 12 million people who’ve come here illegally 
should not be allowed to remain permanently in the United States.” This particular line 
of the conservative policy statement may account, in large part, for the message’s low 
favorability.   
Another dimension across which the policy statements differed was whether or 
not they implicitly conformed to negative stereotyped views of “illegal immigrants.” 
Historically, Republicans have used stereotyped portrayals of ‘illegal immigrants’ as 
dependent and criminal to evoke negative responses and garnering support for their 
position (Luntz, Maslansky Strategic Research, 2005; Luntz, 2007). As a result, the 
study’s conservative statement included “prosecution for using false security numbers,” 
and, “not allowing illegal immigrants to receive any kind of public assistance, welfare or 
medical care.” In contrast, phrasing in the liberal policy statement in the study did not 
generate these types of negative connotations. Instead, it referenced immigrants who 
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“obey our laws, work hard and pay taxes” and who will become “productive, tax-paying 
citizens” and focused the blame on businesses over individuals: “We need to…crack 
down on employers who violate the law and undercut American jobs with cheap labor,” 
and later, with a reference to “illegal employers.” The elicitation of the negative 
stereotype in the conservative statement may also have factored into the sample’s 
response to the conservative immigration policy.  
The ‘ill’ terminology of “illegal immigration”. There are controversies 
surrounding the terms of the debate and the appropriate label for someone who has come 
to this country without legal status; no label is impartial or without its own connotations. 
As the issue has become more topical, terms have shifted, with variations including 
“illegal alien,” “illegal immigrant,” and “undocumented worker,” among others. All 
terms have acquired cultural associations and provoked objections from some. In a July 
2012 article for CNN.com, Charles Garcia argued that the term “illegal immigrant” is 
racially offensive and serves to, “dehumanize the individual and generate animosity 
toward them” (Garcia, 2012). At the same time, “undocumented worker” is largely 
associated with the liberal position and can evoke strong negative reactions among the 
opposition. In conservative strategist Frank Luntz's book, "Words That Work," he lists 
"The 21 Political Words and Phrases You Should Never Say Again." Included is the 
advice to “NEVER SAY” “Undocumented workers” and instead to use “Illegal 
immigrant,” with the precise note that “The label used to describe” these individuals 
"determines the attitudes people have toward them" (2007, p. 284). During the time frame 
of this study, “illegal immigrant” was the most commonly used term, and was the 
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recommendation of the Associated Press Stylebook4 (as well of the term of choice for 
editors at the New York Times and CNN) (Garcia, 2012). For these reasons, “illegal 
immigrant” was the term used in this study’s immigration messages, both liberal and 
conservative. Nevertheless, it is possible that the use of “illegal immigrant” dampened 
ratings for the issue of immigration reform in general. 
Political identity and policy preference. In general, the relationship between 
political identity and policy preference was a compelling and complex one. Self-reported 
political identity (party and ideological orientation) predicted preference for the 
ideologically consistent policies for the energy messages (i.e. liberals preferred the liberal 
policy, conservatives preferred the conservative policy), but not for the immigration 
messages. Examined more closely, the lack of congruence between political identity and 
policy preference for the immigration messages appears to be largely due to the response 
from those on the conservative end of the spectrum—liberals showed the expected 
preference for the liberal policy, but conservatives, contrary to expectation, also preferred 
the liberal policy. In fact, with the exception of Republicans, all groups (ideological and 
party) preferred the liberal immigration policy to the conservative one. Of note, although 
ideological groups showed the same preference, the degree of preference did differ along 
ideological lines: liberals showed the largest difference, followed by moderates, and then 
conservatives. Another interesting finding regarding immigration policies was that the 
degree of preference and positivity of ratings were not related; although liberals showed 
the greatest split in policy ratings (preferring the liberal to the conservative message), 
conservatives’ evaluations of both policies were more positive than those of liberals and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The AP Stylebook is the standard-setter on word use for all mainstream media, including print, television 
and radio.  
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moderates. This was not true for the energy messages—here, liberals preferred the liberal 
policy and rated it more positively than other groups did; conservatives preferred the 
conservative policy and rated it more positively than other groups did. The pattern of 
immigration policy preferences resonates with aforementioned polling data that indicate 
strong agreement regarding a “path to citizenship” and strong disagreement with “mass 
deportation” among the public at large, and even among those on the 
conservative/Republican end of the political spectrum (although to a lesser degree than 
their liberal/Democrat counterparts). These findings are better understood in light of the 
following considerations regarding partisanship, current politics, and the NYC sampling 
population.  
Partisan divide on energy policy: national politics and study messages. In the 
country at large, attitudes toward energy policies differ strongly along partisan lines. 
Public opinion data collected by the Pew Research Center between April 5th and April 
14th, 2012 show that, among 12 major realms of political topics, the issue with the second 
largest partisan divide was the environment (social safety net was 1st, Immigration shared 
the 5th spot). In the Pew survey, 93% of Democrats, as compared to 47% of Republicans, 
agreed that there “needs to be stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment.” 
Of the variables measured (sex, age, generation5, race, income, religious preference), 
political party identification accounted for the largest amount of the variance on this item, 
followed by race (90% of blacks agreed, 82% of Hispanics, and 69% of whites). On the 
item, “People should be willing to pay higher prices in order to protect the environment,” 
the largest divide was also along party lines; 58% of Democrats and 45% of Independents 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 In the Pew Survey, generation was considered as a separate variable from age, dividing the sample into 
age cohorts (Millennial, Gen X, Boomers, Silent)  
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agreed with this statement, while only 25% of Republicans did. Furthermore, one of the 
strongest indications of this partisan split on energy policy is seen in the declining 
number of Republicans who support funding alternative energy research. In recent years 
(between 2006 2011), this percentage decreased drastically from 83% to 53% (Pew 
Values Survey, 2012). 
The study’s conservative and liberal energy policies mirror the partisan split on 
this topic, differing along three major dimensions: (1) renewable sources of energy, (2) 
traditional sources of energy, and (3) regulation and government involvement. The 
respective policies also accord with the following summary of liberal and conservative 
positions on energy and the environment6 (Laser, 2012):  
 The liberal view 
• Our health, and our children’s, depends on the quality of the air we breathe 
and the water we drink. The environment is infinitely precious—and it’s not 
infinitely capable of healing itself. We need to protect our air and water from 
pollution, and to preserve unspoiled wilderness from thoughtless development. 
• The challenge of global warming presents us with an opportunity: by investing 
in clean energy technology (as China already has done), we can prevent the 
worst consequences of climate change and reinvigorate our economy. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The liberal and conservative statements for both issues (Appendix A and B) represent the respective 
positions of the Democratic and Republican parties at the time of the study. Construct validity is supported 
by a review of recent Democratic and Republican platforms, as well as public opinion data on the issues 
(Democratic National Committee, 2012;  Halloran, 2012; Pew Values Survey, 2012; Republican National 
Committee, 2012). In addition to addressing topic-specific differences, the policy statements in the study 
maintained allegiance to more general liberal and conservative ideological differences in their stance 
toward business, the private sector, the role of government, and the social safety net. 
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The conservative view 
• The earth is ours to use responsibly. Some people make a religion out of 
preserving wild lands, but they don’t realize how much of the earth remains 
untouched. We’re nowhere near using it up. 
• When clean energy can compete with fossil fuels in the marketplace—i.e., when 
it becomes affordable—then it may be widely adopted. Forcing people to pay a 
premium for “environmentally correct” energy is the wrong way to go. 
Figure 8 highlights specific language used in each statement that relates to differences 
















































Figure 8. Dimensions of difference and corresponding phrasing in study’s liberal and 
conservative energy statements. 
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Partisanship and immigration reform. As indicated by the Pew Values Survey 
(2012), there is less of a partisan divide in attitudes toward immigration policy than in 
attitudes toward energy policy. Yet, the same polling confirms that immigration reform 
remains a partisan issue, and that in fact, views on immigration have become more 
partisan and differentiated over the last 10 years. Pew Research Center data show that in 
2002, there was on average a four-point difference in how Democrats and Republicans 
thought about immigration; in 2012, this difference had increased to 24 points (Pew 
Values Survey, 2012). Nevertheless, the country appears to be in agreement on many 
central aspects of immigration reform, and this overlap was reflected in the liberal and 
conservative policy statements used in this study. For example, two aspects of 
immigration policy – border security and worksite enforcement – were included to some 
degree in both immigration policy statements. While this does not negate the 
consequential differences between the liberal and conservative immigration statements 
described earlier, it may begin to explain the lack of congruence between political 
identity and policy preference for the immigration messages.  
Immigration politics in NYC. Although immigration reform was becoming more 
of a focus in national politics, there is no indication that the topic of “illegal immigration” 
was a particularly salient issue in New York City at the time of data collection. New 
York State consistently ranks among the six highest states in immigration population 
(mainly due to the high concentration of immigrants in New York City); recent reports 
from both the Department of Homeland Security and the Pew Hispanic Center list it as 
4th, with only the California, Texas and Florida having more (Johnson & Hill, 2011; 
Passel & Cohn, 2011; Hoefer, Rytina, & Baker, 2012). Common sense might predict that 
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the issue would be a more intense or passionate one in areas where there is a more 
immediate impact, usually by virtue of high immigrant populations. However, this 
assumption may not be true upon closer examination. While there is research to suggest 
that during periods of high attention to immigration in national politics, anti-immigration 
attitudes increase among “established residents” in the country, living in areas with a 
larger proportion of immigrants does not appear to contribute to the negativity of these 
attitudes (Hopkins, 2010). Consistent with this finding, in spite of New York’s large 
immigrant population, a 2010 Marist poll concludes that immigration was not a major 
concern for New York City residents. This polling also found that the level of concern 
did not differ along racial lines: it was of “minor concern” to 45% of whites, 42% of 
blacks and 38% of Latinos (Marist Poll, 2012; McShane, 2012).  
The relativity of political identification. The nature of the New York City 
partisan must be considered in contextualizing the sample and interpreting the data. 
People’s self-judgments are always relative to those around them: it is not a stretch to 
imagine that the average participant who identified as “Strongly Republican” in New 
York City would not be as “strongly” Republican as many people in more conservative 
areas of the United States. Moreover, the constellation of attitudes and opinions that 
might characterize the typical New York City Republican may bear little resemblance to 
those of the Mississippi Republican, or the Iowa Republican. Party labels are just that – 
labels; they represent views on numerous, specific issues and a handful of broader ideals 
that are by no means monolithic within the party or for individuals. For this reason, they 
are potentially a weak proxy for the participants’ pre-existing attitudes on any given 
issue. Likewise, participants’ ratings of themselves on the spectrum of conservatism to 
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liberalism are also relative and rather non-specific. Conservatism and liberalism have 
different meanings to different people. One particularly relevant example: conservatism 
has at least two popular dimensions, financial and social. Someone who identifies as 
‘fiscally’ conservative may be liberal on social issues and vice versa. In a place like New 
York City, there is a high likelihood that conservatives and Republicans overlap with 
Democrats and liberals on social issues more than the average person indicating those 
self-descriptions in other parts of the country.  
Conclusion. Situating the public policy issues within the political climate at the 
time of data collection and contextualizing the nature of political identity within NYC 
offer reasons to suggest it is less valid to consider the conservative message as 
ideologically congruent for conservatives in this sample. Taken together, considerations 
of relative partisanship, national attitudes toward each issue, and the character of local 
politics, help explain why conservatives preferred the liberal immigration message to the 
conservative immigration message, and why preference for energy policy fell along 
ideological (and party) lines.      
The Impact of Affective Priming  
In designing this study, broad hypotheses were proposed for a generalized impact 
of the affective introductions across participants and political groups. Results do not 
support these initial hypotheses. First, there was no overall effect of the emotionally-
compelling introductions independent of considerations of differences in political bent 
and content of the policy statements. Second, contrary to prediction, political party 
affiliation was highly determinative of whether the priming manipulation had an impact. 
Furthermore, the effects of prime, when detected, were often not in the predicted 
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direction—in many cases, the ‘affective’ introduction was associated with less favorable 
evaluations than the “non-affective” introduction. Together, what the data point to is that 
the influence of introductory statements on message ratings depended upon on a host of 
factors, including partisanship (type and degree), and policy content (topic and 
ideological position). 
 Exploratory analyses revealed effects of order and its potential to moderate the 
effects of prime, adding further nuance and complexity to the analysis and interpretation 
of priming effects. In several cases, order had an independent effect on evaluations—i.e. 
irrespective of prime condition, the statement was evaluated more (less) favorably based 
on whether it was seen following a contrasting policy or in isolation (messages seen first, 
without any preceding experimental stimuli). For all straightforward order effects, the 
contrast served to either increase ratings for the group’s preferred policy (e.g. Leaning-
Republicans—liberal immigration policy) or decrease ratings for the non-preferred policy 
(e.g. Democrats—conservative energy policy, Republicans—liberal immigration policy). 
However, in most cases, order was significant in its relationship to prime. The most 
prevalent pattern, particularly in the less partisan groups, was that an effect of prime that 
was present (and oftentimes large) when the message was presented first (as if it were the 
only message seen), did not hold when the message was presented second. This also 
suggests an impact of contrast, as well as its relative weight in the evaluative process. 
Although unexpected, the differential effects of prime across policy statements, 
political groups and order were arguably the most interesting aspect of the results; they 
also remain difficult to interpret. Variations in the specific responses of each group 
related to differential responsiveness to the immigration and energy messages, the order 
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in which the two messages were presented to any given participant, and other such 
factors placed a great burden on the study’s power to analyze the influence of prime. 
Effectively, results reflect an interaction between policy content, prime, and message 
order that differed according to political party affiliation. Data were parsed by these 
factors for analysis, generating small group sizes, which severely limited power and 
presented challenges to interpretability. Thus, for many of the subgroup analyses that 
showed large magnitudes of difference based on prime, practical significance could not 
be justifiably interpreted. There were, however, subgroup analyses in which prime effects 
were of large enough magnitude to meet the probability requirements for statistical 
significance, in spite of small group size. 
In what follows, the findings regarding prime will be elaborated upon, so as to 
integrate certain disjointed and underpowered results, and highlight those that showed the 
most consistency. This elaboration will identify trends in the data that seem to best 
capture the effect of prime, and relate them to the theoretical foundation for the study.  
Relationship to pre-existing attitudes. The impact of affective introductions 
varied based on political party affiliation, and for the most part, were only observed when 
political party was accounted for. It follows, then, that political party was a moderating 
factor in the effect of prime. Or, more accurately, something associated with political 
party mediated the impact of the affective introductions. It stands to reason that the 
strength and nature of attitudes toward particular political topics is associated with 
political party affiliation, or partisanship more generally. This prevailing wisdom is 
corroborated by data from the Pew Research Center that show party identification 
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predicts opinions on a wide range of political topics, including policies of energy and 
immigration reform (Pew Values Survey, 2012).  
Of interest, while party affiliation moderated the effects of prime, ideological 
orientation did not. Reasons for this are unclear, given the finding that ideology and party 
equivalently predicted evaluations with regard to issue and policy preference. Since 
political party and ideology were highly correlated, it is unclear what accounts for this 
difference. Other variables in the study did not provide any clarity as to what about party 
affiliation was more pertinent as regards the impact of introductory sentences. It is 
possible that party and ideology are both associated with pre-existing attitudes, but that 
party predicts something further about these attitudes, (e.g. how they relate to prior 
experience and exposure, how entrenched they are, how evocative counter-attitudes are). 
While all of these could potentially relate to whether, and how, judgments were affected 
by emotional appeals (as construed by the introductory sentences), there is presently 
nothing more specific to add to this speculation.   
In the absence of any more precise information on participants’ attitude toward 
the policy issues, it stands that the most likely explanation of the relationship between 
prime and political party is that individual’s pre-existing attitudes mediated the effects of 
prime. Yet, in addition to what’s presented above, there are reasons to believe that party 
was only a weak proxy for pre-existing attitudes in this sample. 
The affective nature of the ‘affective’ introductions. In many cases the 
affectively valenced introductions were associated with lower ratings; this finding was 
unexpected, but can be reconciled with the study’s theorized mechanism of affective 
priming. These results do not accord with the initial hypothesis that the affectively 
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arousing prime would only act in one direction—to increase positivity of evaluations. 
However, neither does it present a fatal challenge to the theoretical grounding for this 
research. It is quite possible that a prime-related decrease in ‘liking’ could have been 
affectively driven just as much as a prime-related increase in ‘liking’. The finding that the 
same introduction could positively or negatively influence judgments does not in itself 
indicate that the ‘affective’ introduction failed to induce affective arousal, though it does 
indicate that the assumption that induced affective arousal would be consistently of a 
positive nature needs to be reconsidered.  In retrospect, there are many ways to 
understand why the ‘affective’ introductions in this study may not have generated 
positive affective states, or at least, not when attached to particular policy content, or 
across all groups.  
One important question is whether an association with lower ratings should be 
interpreted as a negative impact of the affective introduction or a positive/neutral impact 
of the non-affective introduction. And vice versa—when the affective introduction was 
associated with higher ratings, was this on account of a positive response to the affective 
introduction or a negative response to the non-affective introduction? Both interpretations 
are equally valid, and the study design is such that attributions of causality cannot be 
made conclusively. That said, a number of results from the analyses inform this question. 
Examining factors relevant to the effect of prime, and if they predicted differences in the 
direction of the effect, provides clues as to potential mediators – how and why the effect 
occurred. 
Affective implications of the differential effects of prime. The direction of the 
prime effect differed based on issue. For energy, the priming manipulation influenced 
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judgments positively or negatively, depending on political party group. But for 
immigration, all effects were such that the affective prime had a negative impact (or the 
non-affective prime had a positive impact) on evaluations. In addition – and not 
surprising given the characteristics of the policy content and distribution of message 
ratings – the introductory sentences were more impactful for the liberal immigration 
policy than the conservative immigration policy. Based on the aforementioned findings, it 
appears that, paradoxically, even though energy is a more partisan issue, the sample may 
have had a more polarized response to immigration reform, suggesting pre-existing 
attitudes toward immigration may have been more negative, more ambivalent or simply 
more variable. This may explain the relationship between partisanship and direction of 
effect for the energy messages (and lack thereof for the conservative messages).  
For energy, the direction of the effect was related to strength of partisanship, such 
that the “affective” introduction was only associated with more positive evaluations in 
less partisan groups (Leaning Democrats, Independents). Depending on the issue, policy 
position, and order of presentation, there were some cases in which the reverse was true – 
when less partisan groups evaluated a policy more favorably in the “non-affective” 
condition. However, there was no case in which the partisan groups (Republicans, 
Democrats) evaluated a message (liberal or conservative policy) more favorably when 
paired with an “affective” introduction. 
One interpretation of this finding is that the affective prime influenced judgments 
in the manner initially hypothesized (generating more positive evaluations through 
affective mechanisms) only when pre-existing attitudes were less formed, or less strongly 
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held. In contrast, when attitudes are more stable or entrenched (as for partisan groups), 
affective appeals had a negative impact (or no impact).  
Another possible explanation for this finding is that partisans’ greater exposure to 
the issues makes them more alert to attempts at persuasion. The ‘affective’ introduction 
may have stood out more starkly as a means of influence when paired with an 
ideologically incongruent policy (e.g. Democrats-conservative policy, Republicans-
liberal policy). The strong language may have felt, to partisans, as if something was being 
‘sold’ to them, thud prompting less favorable evaluations, especially if they recognized 
the subsequent policy as one representing the position of the national Democratic or 
Republican party. This also may imply that, for partisans (and perhaps other groups as 
well), some inference as to what the experimenter was interested in may have negated the 
influence, or in fact prompted the opposite response (See Orne, 1962; Stafford, 2000; 
Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). Many of the findings regarding differential effects of prime 
based on order, also support the idea that the effect of prime was erased or reversed by 
some negative reaction to the comparison, whether in policy, or affective valence. After 
the contrast, the sense that they were being pushed toward (or away) from something may 
have been even more pronounced, prompting a stronger affective reaction. 
Although the appeal of the “affective” introductions is based on values that are 
presumed to be rather universal, it is possible that the affective primes were themselves 
negative stimuli for certain groups, or when combined with certain policies; this too 
would implicate affect in the evaluative process, also in a negative direction. For 
example, the frame of “national security,” “freedom,” and “self-sufficiency,” used in the 
energy prime, may have felt pejorative to Republicans, who evaluated the non-affective 
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message more favorably for both the liberal and conservative policies. If this is the case, 
then a negative affective reaction is implicated in the effect on judgments.  
  Even if the results are considered as a positive reaction to the “non-affective” 
introduction, affect may be the driving factor—in this case toward resolving negative 
affect or conflict. Very speculatively, it is possible the non-affective introduction had a 
mitigating effect on the controversial policy points and/or language in both of the 
immigration messages, such that, when framed as “practical” and “sensible,” ambivalent 
or unpopular attitudes were more easily rationalized than when framed by an affective 
appeal to values. Though the “non-affective” introductions were conceptualized as bland 
and non-stimulating, for the immigration policies, this may have been in the service of 
neutralizing more negative or provocative attitudinal objects.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This dissertation project was broad in its scope, covering both energy and 
immigration policies, and involving complex stimuli (e.g. paragraph length statements 
with multiple policy points). While these aspects of the study design bestowed certain 
advantages, they also provided opportunity for excessive variation that limited the power 
of the data analyses and increased the possibility that the effects of the priming 
manipulation would be obscured. Methodologically, anonymous surveys have obvious 
benefits in their brevity, and accessibility of participants. The disadvantages naturally 
follow. For example, information can be obtained only once; there can be no follow up 
with participants. The randomness of the sample selection is useful, but characterization 
of the sample on anything other than basic categories, is not possible. The opportunity to 
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more conclusively address the questions of this research was limited as well by other 
aspects of the study design and methodology that should be noted.  
The study would have benefitted from an independent analysis of the introductory 
sentences. This would have served as a validity check for the premise that these were (a) 
apolitical, and (b) qualitatively different in emotional valence. In both conditions, the 
sentences were constructed to be equally consistent with a liberal or conservative political 
message, and thus appropriate to match with both. It would have been a useful addition to 
the study, however, to see if, separate from the policy statements, political groups 
responded differently to the primes. A separate study, investigating reactions to the 
primes in and of themselves, might have allowed for better understanding of how the 
values-based language or emotional valence might be having an impact. 
Similarly, the inclusion of a control group who received the policy statements in 
the absence of any introductory sentences would have enhanced the study. The bland 
introductory sentences were used as a control for the affectively valenced introductions, 
to keep consistent the length of message and structure of argument (introduction, 3 body 
points). An additional level of control could have been achieved by the inclusion of a 
group who received a version of the questionnaire with only the policy portions of the 
messages. In sum, a more pure form of control might have enabled isolation of the effect 
of the prime in a more specific way.  
The decision to give multiple messages to each participant granted the 
opportunity to collect a greater amount of data without having to increase the sample 
size. However, in retrospect, a simpler design might have provided more clarity of 
analysis. Looking at two issues advantaged the study in that it helped avoided erroneous 
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conclusions and generalizations that might have come from only testing one issue. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of two issues, as well as the decision to present four 
messages, increased the complexity of the analysis and added substantial variance that 
could not be accounted for. At the same time, while confounding, this additional variance 
is relevant to the understanding of how evaluative processes operate, and should inform 
future research.  
An independent means of assessing attitudes toward the issues (e.g. how 
important is the issue of immigration reform to you?) would have improved the study by 
helping to answer the question of how prior opinion might mediate response to the 
primes. As variables in the analysis, self-identified political party and ideological 
orientation were interpreted as a measure of prior attitude toward the issues; however, 
they were only weak proxies in this regard, perhaps especially so in the political context 
of New York City. Although questionnaire items inquired into participants’ level of 
political knowledge and interest, straightforward questions on how important these two 
specific issues were to the participant would have been useful additional data points.  
Conclusions Regarding the Primacy of Affect and Unconscious Processing  
The study began with a theoretical frame of reference that privileged emotion 
over cognition in information processing, and held that much of this processing goes on 
outside of conscious awareness. There is ample research to support the ubiquity of 
emotional processing, its importance in linguistic communication, and most importantly, 
that affective factors drive decision-making. In this investigation, affectively charged 
linguistic primes were utilized as a mechanism to activate this emotional channel of 
decision-making.  
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Although the affectively valenced introductory statements did not have the direct 
effect expected (or at least not to the extent that it outweighed or overshadowed other 
relevant factors) many aspects of the findings support the pre-eminent role of affect in the 
evaluative process. In light of the complexities of the evaluative process and the 
variegated nature of the stimuli used in the study, the magnitude of the priming effects is 
noteworthy and an affectively motivated influence is posited. Patterns in the data related 
to order of message presentation are also of interest in this regard, as an effect based on 
contrast could potentially operate through the same mechanism--by altering one's 
affective state. However, the nuanced findings regarding the differential effects of the 
introductory sentences do not allow for more than speculation regarding the specifics of 
how the affective priming impacted judgments. Questions remain about whether the 
issues, policy positions and content of the primes themselves were positive, negative or 
ambiguous stimuli for the participants in general or for specific subsets of participants, 
diminishing generalizability.  
Due to the lack of knowledge regarding participants’ conscious attention to the 
presence or absence of the introductory sentences, the role of unconscious processing in 
this study is inconclusive. There is some indication, at least in some conditions, that the 
participants may have taken conscious notice of the affective introductions, but there is 
insufficient information to address this more comprehensively.  
To conclude, the way people relate to political issues is steeped in a variety of 
emotional associations, attitudes, and experiences. The results of this dissertation project 
provide additional support for the notion that politics and the public’s attitude toward 
various policies depend on context, language and other aspects of how information is 
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presented. The overall thrust of the findings is consistent with the premise that the 
psychological state in which one receives (in this case, reads) a political message affects 
one's judgment of the material. Research into the means of this affective influence is 
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It’s time we invest in clean, safe sources of energy like the wind and sun that will never 
run out, using technologies that will create millions of jobs and rebuild our manufacturing 
base. We need to set tougher pollution standards for coal and industrial plants that 
damage our atmosphere, and make them pay if they fail to meet those standards. And we 
need to cut the taxes of families for every dollar they spend on insulating their homes and 





It’s time we focus on exploring all sources of energy available now, by freeing up 
businesses from government regulations that interfere with their ability to get the job 
done. We need to start by promoting new oil exploration, giving tax incentives to 
corporations that extract more oil here in America both on and offshore.  We need to stop 
putting up roadblocks to technologies like nuclear energy and clean coal, which are safe 
and clean, and encourage the private sector to explore both existing and alternative 
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We need to get our borders under control and to crack down on employers who violate 
the law and undercut American jobs with cheap labor. But politicians who say we can 
find and deport twelve million illegal immigrants aren’t being honest. We need to take 
tough measures to secure our borders, crack down on illegal employers, and require those 
who came here without our permission to register, obey our laws, work hard and pay 





That means immigration reform must begin -- and end -- with secure borders. It means a 
strict enforcement policy at places of employment, including prosecution for using false 
security numbers, tracking down those who overstay their visas, and not allowing illegal 
immigrants to receive any kind of public assistance, welfare or medical care. And it 
means that the 12 million people who’ve come here illegally should not be allowed to 
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There’s nothing more important that we can do for our national security, our economy 
and the earth we leave our children than to end our dependence on foreign oil. Freedom, 
independence and self-sufficiency are at the heart of who we are as a nation, and they 




To address our growing energy problems we need economically feasible policies that 
consider issues of energy production, distribution and consumption, taking into account 
relevant environmental factors. Ensuring future energy security for our nation means 
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The first and most important job of government is to protect its people, and you can't 
protect your people if you can't protect your borders. We need comprehensive and 
effective immigration reform, not a band-aid. It’s time our leaders stop trying to score 




We need to address the problem of illegal immigration and find practical resolutions to 
fix the current situation. Having borders that are not properly regulated is not sensible 
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APPENDIX E: DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
 
 
The remaining questions ask some background information about you. 
 
Are you:   Male    Female      
 
How old are you? _____ 
 
What is your marital status? 
 Married   
 Widowed   
 Divorced   
 Separated  
 Never married   
 Partnered, not married 
 
What is the highest grade of school or year of college you completed?  
 0 -11 years    
 High school graduate     
 Technical or vocational school beyond high school     
 2 years of college or less   
 2 years college (junior college)   
 More than 2 years of college/no degree   
 4-year college graduate   
 Post college education    
 
What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? 
 Black/African American    
 Asian/Pacific Islander  
 Native American/American Indian  
 Hispanic/Latino      
 White/Caucasian        
 Other: ___________________  
 
Last year, in 2011, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes? 
 Less than $25,000    
$25,000-$34,999    
 $35,000-$49,990    
 $50,000-$74,999    
 $75,000-$99,999    
$100,000-$149,999    
 $150,000-$250,000    
 $250,000 or more 
 
Some people don’t pay much attention to the political news. How about you? How 
interested would you say that you have been in the political news so far this year? 
 Very much interested     
 Somewhat interested    
 Not much interested 
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How many days in the past week did you watch the news on TV or read the newspaper or 
use the internet to get political news?   
 None  
 1-2 Days  
 3-5 Days  





 Extremely liberal 
 Liberal 
 Slightly liberal  
 Moderate or middle of the road 
 Slightly conservative 
 Conservative  
 Extremely conservative 








 Strongly Republican 
 Not so strongly Republican  
 Independent-leaning Republican  
 Pure Independent 
 Independent-leaning Democrat  
 Not so strongly Democrat  
 Strongly Democrat 
 None of these labels describe me  
 
Over the last 10 years, which of the following have you done?  Check all that apply 
 Signed a written or email petition about a political or social issue  
 Participated in online political discussions 
 Contacted a newspaper or magazine to express your opinion on an issue 
 Attended a public forum or government meeting 
 Called in to a radio or television talk show to express your opinion on a political issue 
 Contributed time or money to a political campaign  
 Taken part in a demonstration, protest, boycott, or march concerning a political issue 
 Contacted an elected official by telephone, letter, email or in person 
 Voted in most national elections 
 Voted in most state and local elections 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thank you for participating in this survey! 
 
 
   95!





Please read the following statement by a candidate for national office.  Afterwards, 
you will make some judgments about it. 
 
 
Candidate A: There’s nothing more important that we can do for our national security, 
our economy and the earth we leave our children than to end our dependence on foreign 
oil. Freedom, independence and self-sufficiency are at the heart of who we are as a 
nation, and they should be at the heart of a robust strategy for energy independence in the 
21st century. It’s time we invest in clean, safe sources of energy like the wind and sun that 
will never run out, using technologies that will create millions of jobs and rebuild our 
manufacturing base. We need to set tougher pollution standards for coal and industrial 
plants that damage our atmosphere, and make them pay if they fail to meet those 
standards. And we need to cut the taxes of families for every dollar they spend on 







How much do you agree with the statement you just read?  Please give a rating from 
0 to 10 by circling a number below, where 10 means you strongly agree with Candidate 
A, and 0 means you strongly disagree with Candidate A, and you can be anywhere in 
between. 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   





Based on everything you heard, would this statement make you more or less likely 
to vote for Candidate A? Please give a rating from 0 to 10 by circling a number below, 
where 10 means the statement you just heard would make you much more likely to vote 
for Candidate A, and 0 means you would be much less likely to vote for A, and you can 
be anywhere in between. 
 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   
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